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PREFACE 
This study tests the role of large blockholders and ownership concentration in the 
restructuring of Czech firms after the first wave of privatization. The degree to which 
these firms were restructured adds value to the firm. This study takes an indepth look at 
the former Soviet Bloc's privatization programs and contrasts other countries with the 
Czech program. It also looks at the subsequent developments of the Czech financial 
markets. 
The results of the empirical tests show an overall decrease in the operating 
efficiency and profitablity of Czech firms in the years immediately following privatization. 
The results also show that ownership plays an important role in restructuring the firm. A 
moderate level of ownership concentration of the three largest blockholders provides has a 
positive relationship with the overall restructuring of the firm. In addition to ownership, 
size, the presence of foreign capital and joint ventures also play an important role. The 
last result is that these operating efficiency changes and ownership structure are priced in 
the Czech market and that the Czech coupon auction correctly priced firms during the 
auction process. 
I would like to thank my committee, Dr. Janice Jadlow, Dr. Ronald Miller, Dr. 
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Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family, Robert and Mary Ann, and Scott and Cara 
for their support. I would also like to thank my friends Bo, Grant, Stacey, Erin V., and 
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love, support and many prayers during my program. Special thanks goes to Jamie, who 
has supported me through all the writing of the last year. Although there are others too 
numerous to name, you have made this possible more than anyone else. 
I would like to dedicate this to those in the Czech Republic who have gone 
through the bitter times of communism only to see things become worse before they 
improved. It is because of their spirit, pride, and willingness to move forward that this 
research can take place. May their road ahead be as glorious as the road they have 
traveled. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After 1989, the countries of the former Soviet Bloc began two broad types of 
reform, political and economic. For the most part, the international community and the 
countries themselves agreed on the goals of these reforms. The goal of the political 
reform is to create a stable democracy. The goal of economic reform is to transform the 
centrally planned economies into market economies. These goals are echoed by Vaclav 
Havel, dissident-playright, now President of the Czech Republic: 
"Perhaps we can all agree that we want a state based on rule of law, 
one that is democratic (that is, with a pluralistic political system), peaceful, 
and with a prospering market economy. · 
"Though my heart may be left of center, I have always known that 
the only economic system that works is a market economy, in which 
everything belongs to someone -- which means that someone is responsible 
for everything. It is a system in which complete independence and plurality 
of economic entities exist within a· legal framework and its workings are 
guided chiefly by the laws of the marketplace. This is the only natural 
economy, the only kind that makes sense, the only one that can lead to 
prosperity, because it is the only one that reflects the nature of life itself" 
Privatization is the centerpiece of economic reform. The central European 
countries had no practical or real experience to guide them through massive privatization 
and economic reform or to indicate what the final outcome of their choices would be. As 
a result, each country chose a different type of privatization plan with varying degrees of 
success in privatization and economic reform. The Czech Republic (CR) centered its 
privatization on the success of coupon privatization. The CR believed that this type of 
privatization would create an equitable distribution of assets to their citizens and an 
effective corporate governance. 
I 
Purpose of the Study 
The rapid transition of the Czech Republic from a centrally planned economy to a 
market economy offers a unique opportunity to study issues of corporate ownership. For 
the purpose of this study, the change in ownership from the government to individuals and 
institutions under the first wave of large scale privatization program in the CR, provides a 
"controlled experiment" of the relationship between ownership structure, operating 
efficiency, and firm value. This study tests the role of large blockholders in resolving 
agency problems and increasing firm operating efficiency when privatizing state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Unlike other Eastern European countries' privatization programs, the 
CR's program allowed a large number of firms, almost 1,000, to be converted 
simultaneously into joint stock companies without the ownership structure being 
predetermined. The final ownership structure pe_rmits varying degrees of ownership 
concentration through large blockholdings by investment funds, more dispersed ownership 
by individual investors, or a combination of both. In addition to differing concentration of 
ownership by investment funds, objectives of investment funds investing in these firms 
differ, but often include oversight of the restructuring of the firm. This study will discover 
which type of ownership structure provided the best restructuring during the first wave of 
mass privatization in the Czech Republic. Restructuring is measured by the effect on 
operating efficiencies and value. 
Previous studies provide a foundation for this study. Studies by Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) present conflicting in results about 
the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
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(1988) test the operational changes in reverse leveraged buyouts. A study by Megginson, 
van Randenborgh, and Nash ( 1994) tests operational efficiency changes in privatized 
firms. More recent studies have shown the importance of large blockholders, especially 
institutional ownership, in reducing agency costs and increasing firm value. Privatization 
in the CR provides data on changes in firm ownership structure, value, and operational 
efficiency during the period of 1992 to 1994 enables an analysis of the effects of changes 
in ownership structure and ownership concentration on the firm. 
Applications of the Study 
The first application of this study concerns the successes of the privatization 
program in the Czech Republic and future government policies. This study uses data from 
the first wave of privatization. The third and final wave of coupon privatization occurs in 
1996. What economic policy the CR will choose between now and the end of the decade 
depends upon the success of the privatization program. Failures and problems in the 
privatization programs over the previous five years will be addressed and corrected as the 
economy begins to develop. Successes should be encouraged. This study win try to 
identify the factors that determine the success or failure of privatized firms within the first 
two years of privatization. With this information, the CR can target the areas of the 
market that need reform and begin the process of making the markets more liquid and 
efficient. 
The second application is for other former communist countries beginning 
privatization programs. The CR, Poland, Russia, and Hungary all launched their 
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privatization programs within a few years of each other. Results are still preliminary, but 
many believe that the CR is·the most successful in the post-communist era. The remaining 
Eastern European and Soviet successor states that are just beginning privatization 
programs can look to the different privatization models of these countries, especially the 
CR, and adapt them to their culture and economy. Even though some of these countries 
have limited privatization programs, most have yet to go through comprehensive 
privatization. These countries can look to see which factors and processes of the CR 
privatization program are most important to the success of their privatization. 
The third application of this research is to add to the evidence that ownership 
structure affects firm value. The exact relationship between ownership concentration and 
the effect on firm's operational efficiency and value has not been determined. This study 
concentrates on the role of a large outside blockholder that monitors the firm and resolves 
agency problems. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present a theoretical model in which a large 
blockholder can increase firm value. Recent empirical studies by Brous and Kini (1994), 
Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) and others provides support for a Shleifer and Vishny 
type model. In the context of the Czech Republic and the restructuring of firms after 
privatization, this study adds to that evidence 
The final application may be made to U.S. markets. The growth of mutual funds 
and other institutional investors in the U.S. provides an opportunity for these institutions 
to obtain a large ownership block in U.S. firms. Although this study does not directly 
address U.S. markets, it does provide evidence that institutions provide powerful 
monitoring of activities and management of firms they own. As U.S. markets become 
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more institutionalized, the role that institutions play in corporate governance can be 
expected to become an important public policy issue. 
To provide a foundation for this research, Chapter II contains a review of existing 
relevant literature. Areas related to this study are agency problems and monitoring issues, 
corporate control and changes in ownership structure, and privatization. The chapter 
concludes by addressing special problems in privatizing former communist countries and a 
comparison between privatization programs in three countries. Chapter III describes the 
Czech privatization process in greater detail as well as current Czech financial markets. 
Hypotheses, methods to test the hypotheses, and data description and selection are 
presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V presents the empirical results·ofthe hypotheses' tests 
and their implications for ownership structure and operating efficiency as well as the 
factors that lead to the successful restructuring of Czech firms. Chapter VI provides 
conclusions. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three areas of literature are related to the conceptual framework ofthis study: 
agency and monitoring issues, corporate control and ownership structure, and 
privatization research. Agency problems that result from the separation of ownership and 
control are discussed in the first subsection. When an efficient labor market for corporate 
managers exists, a market resolution to agency problems exist. These would be the 
market for corporate control, other monitors of managers, and incentive contracts. These 
resolutions reduce agency problems and costs. When firms have low agency costs or 
monitoring costs, ownership structure does not affect firm value. A resolution to the 
firm's agency problem when markets are less efficient is a large blockholder or 
concentrated ownership structure. This is given special consideration in the first 
subsection. The second subsection discusses tests of the effect of ownership 
concentration on firm value and the effect of a market for corporate control on firm value. 
These studies include examination of reverse leverage buyouts to test the impact of 
changes in ownership concentration on changes in operating efficiency. The third 
subsection discusses the broad area of privatization, demonstrating both the rationale for 
governments to privatize, and the effect of privatization on the firm. Results show that 
there is an increase in operating efficiency after a firm has been privatized. 
Agency Problems and Monitoring 
Agency problems have received considerable attention in the finance literature. 
Agency problems can be divided into two broad areas: probl~ms between owners and 
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managers, and problems between equityholders and debtholders. Both problems are 
caused by costly or inefficient monitoring. The latter agency problem manifests itself in 
asset substitution and under investment problems. The former, and the focus ofthis study, 
results in shirking of managerial duties, consumption of corporate resources by managers 
at the owner's expense, and inefficient management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) present 
both types of problems in their landmark paper. Agency costs of the first type can be 
reduced through monitoring ofthe manager and other control activities such as auditing, 
budget restrictions, establishment of incentive compensation plans or increased managerial 
ownership. The amount of monitoring will be determined by the cost of monitoring and 
the reduction in the consumption of perquisites that results from reduced by monitoring. 
The question of whether ownership structure affects firm value is one that has yet to be 
settled. Berle and Means (1933) argue that holders of corporate stock suffer if ownership 
is widely dispersed across a large number of shareholders because a single shareholder 
cannot exercise any power to oversee management petformance in the corporation. 
Management has more freedom to use the firm's resources than it would if ownership were 
concentrated. If management and ownership interests do not coincide, there is a welfare 
loss to shareholders from a decrease in firm value. 
While this problem of separation of ownership and management does exist, it does 
not necessarily result in lower firm value. Demsetz (1983) argues that the structure of 
ownership is not important in determining firm value. Shirking by management or 
increased consumption of amenities will not decrease firm value. These activities are paid 
by the managers through decreased direct compensation. If owners are the managers and 
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they increase consumption of amenities, the owners bear the full cost of their actions. By 
specializing the task of ownership and management, the cost is still born by those that use 
the amenities. The owners will decrease managers' compensation for an increase in 
shirking or on-the-job consumption by managers. Demsetz argues that the net result of a 
specialization in ownership may result in a reduction in on-the-job consumption and 
greater compensation if monitoring costs are low. If there is a difference in monitoring 
effectiveness or costs by owners of different firms, there will be a self-selection by 
managers. Those that wish to consume on-the-job will manage firms with high monitoring 
costs and receive less direct compensation. Those managers that do not desire high on-
the-job consumption will choose firms that have low monitoring costs and pay more in 
direct compensation. If manager and shareholder interests still do not coincide, dispersed 
ownership will become concentrated enough to force a change in management. The cost 
of concentrating ownership may not be insignificant. This high cost would demand on 
going supervision of management so that a concentrated ownership structure is not 
necessary. This is accomplished in part by the board of directors and partly by managerial 
wages and the impact of the manager on corporation performance. Between the self-
selection of managers, the potential for dispersed investors to become concentrated, and 
the monitoring by the board of directors and the market, ownership structure should not 
have an effect on firm value. All else being equal, firms with a dispersed ownership 
structure and a firm with a concentrated ownership structure should have equal values; an 
optimal ownership structure does not exist. 
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Jensen and Meckling assume that outside shareholders are rational and are not 
muve. That is, they will value their equity ownership at the time of issuance in order to 
compensate for agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. 
They also assume that all the monitoring of the firm's managers is done by the outside 
shareholders. This is similar to the Demsetz argument just presented. Fama (1980) 
presents a case where the labor market for managers monitors the managers in order to 
determine future wages. This market helps align managers and shareholders interests in 
that managers will try to maximize the value of the firm in order. tol increase their future 
compensation. Monitoring also occurs internally between managers themselves. Lower 
level management can step over shirking managers above them if this type of monitoring is 
efficient. High level managers are monitored by the board of directors. 
Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983) also show that the separation of 
ownership and control of the firm may improve optimal allocation of risk bearing for the 
owners and managers. This type of organizational structure results in the separation of 
decision management and decision control. The residual claim holders, stockholders, 
retain the function of decision control, the monitoring and the ratification of decisions. 
Decision management is the function of the managers of the firm. In large, complex 
organizations, specific knowledge to make decisions is needed, but this knowledge is 
diffused among several decision agents. Delegation to those that have the knowledge to 
make decisions, the managers, can reduce the cost of decision management. 
If decision control is concentrated in one or a few individuals and monitoring is 
direct and simple, agency costs are reduced. When there are many residual claimants (a 
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diffuse ownership structure) it is costly for each to monitor decision management. In this 
case, it is efficient for them to delegate decision control. The function can be delegated to 
one of several parties. The market acts as one type of external monitor by valuing the 
firm. The market for corporate takeovers is another external monitor. An internal 
delegated monitor is the board of directors, especially those that have outside, expert 
members on the board. 
Each argument that supporting the claim that firm value is independent of 
ownership structure relies on efficient, well functioning markets to resolve the agency 
problems associated with separation of ownership arid management. As it pertains to the 
CR, these markets may not have achieved the efficiency required to.monitor management. 
Many of the control mechanisms do not yet exist in the CR. If financial and corporate 
control markets are important in monitoring, they will eventually develop as capital, labor, 
and other economic markets develop. 
A large outside shareholder may be a resolution to this agency problem. Shleifer 
and Vishny ( 1986) develop a theoretical model that uses a large outside shareholder as a 
monitor. In their model, the large shareholder has an incentive to monitor and spend 
resources to monitor the current management and find valuable improvements in the firm's 
operating strategy. The large shareholder has several ways to implement these 
improvements. The shareholder may use a takeover mechanism to replace current 
management with its own management team; it may use a proxy fight in order to achieve 
the same results at potentially less cost; or it may enter into "informational negotiations" 
with current management to implement change. They refer to the last option as the 
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"jawboning" mechanism. A major conclusion of this model is that when both jawboning 
and takeover mechanisms are available, the market value of the firm increases with the 
percentage of the firm owned by the large shareholder up to majority control (proposition 
4). This implies that large outside shareholders serve as important monitors and as a 
means of change in firm's operations where valuable opportunities for efficiency changes 
are necessary. Institutional ownership may provide the monitoring necessary to increase 
the value of the firm. 
Tests ofBlockholder's Value. Two recent papers, Bathala, Moon, and Rao 
(1994) and Brous and Kini (1994), look at the role of institutional ownership in 
monitoring decisions and wealth effects on the firm .. The first study looks at the debt 
policy of a firm and the role of institutional ownership as a monitor. They note that debt 
and management ownership serve to reduce agency costs. In addition, external monitors 
also reduce agency costs. They hypothesize that external monitoring substitutes for debt 
and managerial ownership. They find that external monitoring by institutional owners is 
negatively related to debt. This indicates that institutions serve as effective monitors. 
Brous and Kini analyze a firm's decision to issue seasoned equity. Empirically, it 
has been noted that the issuance of equity is value decreasing, possibly due to the factors 
outlined by Myers and Majluf Myers and Majluf present a case where managers act to 
increase the wealth of current shareholders. The managers can invest in a positive net 
present value project, but cannot finance the project internally. The method of financing 
determines if the project is accepted. In their analysis, the mangers will only issue equity if 
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they believe the share is overvalued by the market. Therefore, issuing seasoned equity 
serves as a signal the stock price is too high, causing a reduction in the share price in the 
market. High institutional ownership (high ownership concentration) should reduce this 
problem in two ways. First, institutional oWners want to protect their investment and will 
discourage value decreasing decisions. Secondly, institutional owners may produce more 
information and reduce the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders. 
Their empirical results find a significant positive relationship between the returns 
surrounding seasoned equity announcement and institutional ownership. They conclude 
that institutional owners serve as effective monitors. Both of these studies support 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) claim that institutional owners serve as an efficient monitor 
and a positive relationship exists between firm value and institutional ownership. These 
findings are consistent with the notion that markets value the role of outside agents as 
monitors as noted by Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990). 
Another recent study tests the effect of creating a new blockholder on firm value 
and efficiency. Shome and Singh (1995) find a significantly positive impact on the value 
of the firm when new blockholders are formed and a net gain to the blockholder. These 
gains are explain~d by the wealth transfer from bondholders, the size of the blockholding 
and the identity (corporation or institution) of the blockholder. The study also finds weak 
evidence of hands-on monitoring of performance on an ongoing basis. 
Park and Song (1995) analyze the role ofblockholders when Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are established or expanded. If the ESOP entrenches 
managers, the improvement in the firm's performance is limited to firms with outside 
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blockholders. Park and Song conclude by stating that "the presence of a blockholder 
probably concerns management, either because of their close monitoring or a higher 
likelihood of an acquisition attempt by those blockholders." These authors find that 
blockholders provide valuable monitoring that increases the performance of the firm. 
In restructuring privatized firms in the CR, we should find that firms with high 
institutional ownership (high ownership concentration) should have a higher value than 
firms with low institutional ownership due to effective monitoring and also due to value 
increasing changes in the Shleifer and Vishny sense. 
Corporate Control and Ownership Structure 
A test of a linear relationship between firm value and ownership concentration 
based on Demsetz (1983) was conducted by Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Their results find 
no relationship between ownership, measured by percentage of the firm owned by the five 
and twenty largest shareholders, and firm value. They hypothesize that other factors 
determine firm value other than ownership structure. One factor is size. Large firms have 
a larger market value per fraction of ownership, implying a larger wealth commitment by . 
owners. If owners are risk averse, then they would diversify their holdings and reduce 
their ownership in the firm. 
Control potential is another determinate of ownership structure. If the manager is 
easy to monitor, there is not a need for a large concentration of ownership. If managers 
are difficult to monitor, e. g. when a firm's earnings are variable and difficult to observe 
and predict, the ownership concentration should increase. An increase in managerial 
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ownership will help reduce the agency problem by aligning owners' and managers' 
interests. Regulation should reduce the control potential of a firm by using the 
government as a monitor and therefore reduce the need for ownership concentration to 
help monitor regulated firms. Another potential determinant of corporate ownership 
structure is the amenity potential, the increase in utility from ownership. This may exist in 
industries where there is a prestige factor associated with being an owner, such as sporting 
franchises or media companies. Demsetz and Lehn do find that these factors are 
significant in explaining ownership structure, but that ownership and firm value are not 
related. 
Another test of ownership concentration and firm value was reported by Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). These authors analyze insider ownership concentration as 
opposed to all ownership concentration in Demsetz and Lehn. Two competing hypotheses 
of inside ownership and firm value are tested. An increase in inside ownership serves to 
align the interests of owners and managers. Higher levels of insider ownership will cause 
managers to work in the shareholder's interest. The competing hypothesis is that a large 
amount of inside ownership will help entrench current managers and cause them to not 
respond to shareholders. This is due to the fact that inside ownership neutralizes the 
market for corporate control as a control mechanism. The probability of the firm being 
taken over is reduced and managers are more secure in their Job and can pursue 
maximization of their own welfare. Management can be entrenched with low amounts of 
ownership due to widely dispersed ownership of the remaining shares or because of a long 
term relationship of the manager with the firm, such as the case with families that started 
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the firm. The empirical test of firm value and insider ownership concentration is measured 
in a piecewise regression of Tobin's Q (a proxy for firm value) and ownership holdings of 
the board of directors and executive officers. They find a positive relationship between 
firm value and insider ownership for low levels (less than 5%) of ownership, supporting 
the convergence of interests hypothesis. For higher levels of ownership (between 5% and 
25%), there is a negative relationship, supporting the entrenchment hypothesis. For a 
level of insider ownership above 25%, the relationship is again positive. The authors 
conclude that ownership is associated with firm value, but the relationship is not linear. 
A variation of the previous study of insider ownership examines majority 
ownership, ownership between 50% and 100% of equity. Majority ownership allows for 
the possibility that the owners will expropriate or consume a substantial portion of 
corporate wealth. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find abnormal positive returns around 
the trading of majority blocks. This result is inconsistent with expropriation by majority 
shareholders. They also find that executive compensation is not excessively high in 
majority owned firms as compared to diffuse ownership firms. However, there is a 
difference in returns and Tobin's Q depending on the type of majority owner. Firms who 
have majority ownership by an individual have systematically lower returns than firms that 
have majority ownership by corporations. Their major conclusions find that majority 
owners do not expropriate wealth, there are several implications of large block ownership, 
and the type of large block owner is important. 
Another line of research in corporate ownership structure and the effects on firm 
value is corporate control and takeovers. A potential problem with research in this area 
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for this study is that many firms used in corporate control/takeover research do not 
continue to operate as an independent going concern. Many of the firms were absorbed 
into larger corporations or divested and sold as smaller firms. An exception to these 
studies is leveraged buyouts (LBOs), and especially reverse leveraged buyouts. Reverse 
LBOs are firms taken private through a LBO and then taken public through a stock issue. 
The gains from going private through a LBO may be caused by improvements in operating 
performance due to a more efficient operating structure and better allocation of residual 
claims, or because of wealth transfers from uninformed investors to informed investors. 
Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990) both find operating performance improves significantly 
after a LBO. This indicates that gains from going private are not just mere wealth 
transfers, but changes due to more efficient operating structures. A LBO concentrates 
ownership, allowing the owners to make. changes they may not have been able to make in 
a dispersed ownership structure. 
Reverse LBOs offer a unique opportunity to analyze the changes made while the 
firm was privately held because the firm is required to disclose financial statements for 
several years of private ownership for the initial public offering (IPO). This can provide 
direct evidence of the effects on operating efficiency due to the LBO. Studies of reverse 
LBOs also test market's reaction to the "resale" of the previously bought out companies. 
Several studies have analyzed reverse LBOs price performance and efficiency 
gams. The first of these studies was conducted by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990). 
Part of their study was to examine whether improvements in productivity and asset 
utilization occurred after the LBO. They also look at changes in equity value between the 
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LBO and the IPO. In testing changes in efficiency under private ( concentrated) 
ownership, Muscarella and Vetsuypens look at the changes in six accounting efficiency 
measures: Sales, Gross Profit Margin, Operating Profit Margin, Net Profit Margin, Asset 
Turnover, and Sales per Employee. They find that reverse LBOs experience 
improvements in operating performance when compared to the performance of the firm 
over a time period when the firm was public and when compared to randomly selected 
firms over the same time period. They believe the profitability gains are due to the firms' 
ability to control production costs rather than increasing sales or divestiture/acquisition 
activity. These gains in efficiency of operations are reflected in the prices of the IPO of 
the reverse LBO. Comparisons of price data of the price per share paid at the time of the 
LBO and the price paid for share at the time of the IPO, adjusted for stock splits, etc., 
reveal a significant rate of return on equity. An annualized rate of return of268% for the 
full sample was computed. 
DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) argue that reverse LBOs are subject to some 
informational asymmetry problems when they return to public markets. First, managers 
(owners) of the LBO have an incentive to manipulate performance while the firm is private 
and especially just prior to the public offering. Muscarella and Vetsuypens find no 
evidence of manager manipulation. Another problem is the timing of the IPO issue after a 
year in which the firm had good performance. DeGeorge and Zeckhauser find reverse 
LBOs perform better than continuing LBOs and other public firms on average, in the year 
before they go public again. They also find that in the year after going public, reverse 
LBOs perform worse than other firms on average. In pricing LBOs, the authors find that 
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the market correctly anticipates the performance of reverse LB Os. The issues are not 
significantly underpriced and do not underperform comparison firms over a two year 
horizon following the IPO. 
Another study of reverse LB Os by Mian and Rosenfeld ( 1993) analyzes long run 
(three year) price performance. Over the three year horizon, they find reverse LBOs have 
significant positive abnormal returns which lends support to Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
claim that reverse LBOs undergo increases in efficiency and profitability. The abnormal 
returns may also be driven by takeover activity of these reverse LB Os in the three years 
after going public. Overall, there does not seem to be any differences in organizational or 
operational efficiency between firms that were taken over versus firms that were not. 
In summary, although perfect markets and market resolutions to agency problems 
do not allow for a relationship between ownership structure and firm value, empirical 
studies have provided evidence of such a relationship. Studies of the reverse LBO 
markets provide evidence that a concentrated ownership structure does improve firm 
value by changing the operations of the firm so it becomes more efficient. Going public 
again allows the owners to capture those gains through partial liquidation of their 
holdings. This line of reasoning should also apply to the privatization of firms in the CR. 
A concentration of ownership will allow the owners to monitor more closely and make 
operational changes in the firm in order to improve efficiency. The gains from efficiency 
should be greater for firms with a high concentration of ownership, or firms that are 
owned and managed by those who have expertise in restructuring the current operations. 
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Privatization 
There are two strands of privatization literature. The first area concerns the 
economic and social welfare (macroeconomic) issues and the sequence of privatizations. 
The second area is the method of privatization and the changes in the firm once it 1s 
privatized. Each area will be discussed in turn. 
Macroeconomic Issues. Ramamurti (1992) notes that countries privatizing state 
owned enterprises (S0Es) are developing countries with high budget deficits, high foreign 
debt, and high dependence on agencies such as the IMF and World Bank, but not 
necessarily countries with poor operating performance by their S0Es. Another factor in 
privatization decisions is the growth and development of the private sector market which 
indicates it is able to take over tasks previously done by state enterprises. Privatizations 
occur because of country factors and not firm specific factors. The main emphasis should 
be on the country and not the individual firm. 
Brainard (1991) and to a lesser extent Aghion (1993) point out the importance of 
institutions, especially banking and intermediaries in the privatization process. Without 
first reforming th~ capital markets and banks, privatization would not succeed for the lack 
of capital and methods to restructure industrial firms. In addition, Roland ( 1993) suggests 
that a gradual privatization has a smaller opportunity and social welfare cost and is more 
efficient method than a fast, massive privatization. The reasoning is that if a privatization 
plan is not working, it can be reversed before it becomes too costly to stop or undo. A 
massive privatization program cannot be easily reversed and is therefore considered 
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permanent. If there is uncertainty about the effects of privatization, a gradual method is 
preferred. However, there are dangers to partial reform and movement to a market 
economy. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) show that partial reform or privatization 
may lead to a distortion of prices the state charges and those set by the markets and the 
allocation of materials and resources between the private firms and· the state owned and 
regulated firms. The authors recommend a "big bang" approach to price reform and 
privatization in the former Soviet Bloc. 
Husain and Sahay (1992) consider which industries should be privatized first. The 
economy consists of two types of firms, upstream firms using raw materials to produce an 
intermediate good, and downstream firms using the intermediate goods to produce a final 
good. The authors conclude that given imperfect markets, high industrial concentration in 
firms, and trade liberalization, all of which characterize centrally planned economies of 
central Europe and Russia, the sector facing less uncertainty and containing a relatively 
less concentrated industrial structure (more firms operating in the same industry) should 
be privatized first. 
Method of Privatization. The second area of research focuses on the method of 
privatization (auction, tender offer, voucher, etc.) and the gains in efficiency in the firms 
once privatization occurs. This area of research is more pertinent to this study. Perotti 
and Guney (1993) focus their study on the structure of privatization plans in non-
communist countries. They observe that privatization is similar to initial public offerings 
(IP Os) by the current owners. In comparison to IPOs, more information is known about 
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SOEs, and therefore less risk and a higher price could be expected in privatizations. The 
empirical evidence shows otherwise. The underpricing in privatizations is even greater 
than in IPOs. Explanations for this include signaling of political intentions of the 
government to commit to the privatization plan, distributional concerns, and the method of 
using primarily fixed price offers instead of auction sales. The authors find using an 
auction in privatizing SOEs results in less underpricing than a fixed price offer, but fixed 
price offers are used over 80% of the time. With an auction process like that of the Czech 
Republic, the unerpricing is reduced. The amount of government ownership is also a 
factor. The government giving up controlling interest, but retaining a large share, sends a 
positive signal to the market. Perotti and Guney interpret this signal as a commitment by 
the government to guarantee the success of the privatized firm. If the privatization 
succeeds, and the price of shares increase, then the government can sell its remaining 
shares at a higher price than if it sold all the shares initially. This is similar to the 
arguments put forth by Leland and Pyle ( 1977) where the entrepreneur sends a signal of 
high quality by retaining a higher portion of the firm instead of using outside financing. 
Distributional issues are also important in privatizations. Seth (1989) investigates 
privatizations in western countries such as U. K., France, and Japan and why a wide 
distribution of shares is desirable and how shares of privatized firms have been distributed 
in these countries. A wide distribution of shares may reduce stock price volatility, achieve 
portfolio diversification for individual investors, and reduce the risk transferred to the 
equity market. Seth points out that institutional investors are believed to cause stock price 
volatility and a wide distribution, low institutional investment, will reduce volatility. If the 
21 
goal of privatization is a wide distribution of ownership, then a fixed price offering is 
preferred. His study indicates privatization occurs mainly through underpriced fixed price 
offerings, but it does not reverse the trend of decreased ownership by individuals. A wide 
distribution of shares is not preferred in former Soviet Bloc countries because it does not 
provide effective monitoring by the owners of the firm. Lipton and Sachs gives this issue 
more attention and is discussed in the following section. 
Prager (1992) argues that privately owned firms are more efficient than SOEs. 
The reason for this efficiency gain is that wealth maximization may be just one of several 
objectives that SOE management must meet. Public sector management is subject to 
intervention from political officials, employee incentive programs are not as flexible or 
effective in the public sector, and a soft budget constraint may encourage inefficiency in 
the public sector. Al-Obaidan and Scully (1991) cite political employment policy (full 
employment), government protection through subsidies or tariffs, and the lack of measures 
of manager performance as causes of inefficiency. This last reason would lead to shirking 
of management responsibilities and decisions. In their study, they contrast privately 
owned oil companies with state owned oil companies and test for three types of 
inefficiencies in SOEs. Using statistical regressions and estimation of production functions 
and efficiency frontiers, they test for technical inefficiency, scale inefficiency, and 
allocative inefficiency. Using a vertical integration ratio, a multinational integration ratio 
(foreign vs. domestic production), output (in barrels) to total assets, total revenue, and 
type of ownership, their results indicate that private companies have higher capital and 
productivity ratios than SOEs. Technical efficiency is 14% lower for a state owned oil 
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firm, and current output of state owned oil firms requires about half the current inputs that 
they use. 
A recent test of firms' changes and increases in efficiency after they were privatized 
was done by Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994). Their sample consisted of 
61 companies from eighteen different countries, none of which included former Soviet 
Bloc countries. To measure changes in efficiency, profitability and structure of the 
privatized firms, they compared key accounting ratios before and after privatization of 
these firms. The thirteen ratios used fall into seven categories. Profitability is measured 
by return on sales, return on assets, and return on equity. Operating efficiency is 
measured by sales efficiency ( sales/number of employees) and net income efficiency ( net 
income/number of employees). Capital investment is measured by capital expenditures to 
sales and capital expenditures to assets. Output is measured by real sales (nominal sales/ 
consumer price index) and employment is measured by total employment. Leverage 
changes are measured by debt to assets and long-term debt to equity. The last category is 
dividend payout which is measured by dividends to sales and dividend payout ratio. 
These ratios were computed for three years before privatization and for three years 
following privatization. The means of the ratios are compared between the two periods. 
They use a nonparametric signed rank test to test for significant differences between the 
two periods. They find significant increases in profitability, employee output, capital 
spending, and total employment. They also find lower leverage levels and higher dividend 
payout. The results strongly support that firms significantly increase operating efficiency 
and profitability after privatization as well as make structural changes in financing policy. 
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The authors also find a significant turnover rate in corporate governance as measured by 
new members on the board of directors. Firms that have a high turnover rate in the board 
of directors experienced larger increases in operating efficiency, profitability, and capital 
investment than firms that have a lower turnover rates in the board. However, the 
differences are not statistically significant. 
Former Soviet Bloc Privatization Programs 
The previous section reviewing privatization research does not consider many of 
the unique features of the privatizations in the former Soviet Bloc countries. In previous 
studies of privatizing SO Es, the firms were sold in developed capital markets for cash. 
Many of the studies also looked at or considered a limited privatization program, one in 
which the number of firms that were being privatized were small, or that the privatization 
program was conducted over a long period of time. The context in which privatizations 
have taken place in the former Soviet Bloc counties affects both the method of the 
privatizations and the outcomes. 
Goals in Massive Privatization. In structuring privatization programs for the 
former Soviet Bloc, the IPO methods used in Western Europe and other countries would 
not succeed. Lipton and Sachs (1990) state four limitations of using the IPO 
privatizations in Eastern Europe. First, public offerings require valuation of each firm, 
which requires accurate and detailed information of each firm. With the number of firms 
to be privatized and the operating and accounting system inefficiencies of these firms, this 
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may not be possible. Secondly, the public cannot afford to buy the firms being privatized. 
The wealth the citizens of these countries hold is at most a small fraction of the true value 
of the firms. If the firms were sold for the true market value, most of the firms would 
have to be sold to foreigners, giving citizens little or no ownership in these firms, and a 
low probability of owning these firms in the future. Thirdly, IPO privatizations used 
elsewhere lead to a widely dispersed ownership which may not be desirable for the firms 
of Eastern Europe (this will be discussed in more detail later). Finally, Lipton and Sachs 
believe that relying on IPO privatizations will result in only the most profitable firms being 
privatized, leaving the state to continue operating the unprofitable firms. 
Lipton and Sachs also present a case that the primary guide to privatization in 
Eastern Europe should be property rights and effective corporate governance. Previously, 
all firms were owned by the state and there was no private property or property rights. 
The privatization of these firms (mostly into joint stock companies, corporations) requires 
the definition of property rights and creation of markets (stock exchanges, banking 
system) and institutions (financial intermediaries, mutual funds, etc.) to facilitate 
transactions of prnperty holders. One of the primary concerns of property rights is the 
potential of current managers, politicians, and workers' councils to either strengthen their 
claim on assets or expropriate some or a significant portion of the firms' assets to their 
own benefit instead of turning them over for privatization and someone else's control. 
Effective corporate governance plays a dual role. First, it plays the role of 
reducing the potential problem of current managers or workers transferring the firm's 
wealth and assets for personal use. Second, it plays the role of creating an effective 
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management of the newly privatized assets. Communism created an economic system 
where sub-optimal management of firms was widespread. Many of these managers owed 
their position to party allegiance rather than proven, competent management. Other 
managers were in their position because of technical or engineering expertise which was 
essential to the survival of the planned economy. Lipton and Sachs suggest that corporate 
governance should extend from the ownership of the firms' shares of stock. Ownership of 
the firm should be held by households, financial intermediaries, and other nonfinancial 
firms. They further suggest that firms' shares should avoid an "atomistic" or small, widely 
dispersed ownership structure, but "divided up into tranches among various groups and 
financial institutions that will have an incentive to monitor the enterprise and promote 
sound management." They propose a split of block shares among workers, pension funds 
and commercial banks, and to mutual funds which are in tum owned by individuals. This 
recommendation is based on the belief that large blockholders are better able to monitor 
the firm and the political realities of Eastern Europe. 
Comparison of Polish, Czech and Russian Plans. Lipton and Sachs proposed these 
plans in 1989 an~ 1990 before massive privatization began. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1994) compare the Polish, Czech, and Russian privatization experiences. Each of these 
countries' privatization plans had the same goals and shared some similarities, but there are 
some marked differences. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (BSV) maintain while the primary 
motivation of privatization is economic, the process and methods are politically influenced. 
The politicizing of privatization did not sacrifice economic efficiency to a large degree. 
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All three countries used a mass privatization system. This was influenced by the number 
of companies to be privatized. Privatizing a few firms a month would take over forty 
years in what the CR accomplished in about a year. Within the framework of mass 
privatization, all three countries desired to achieve an effective corporate governance in 
order to monitor the firm and improve operating efficiency. 
The Czech and Russian methods were more similar to each other than the Polish 
method. The Polish method reflected many ideas expressed by Lipton and Sachs, partly 
because Sachs served as an advisor to the Polish government in designing the privatization 
program. In the Polish system, 400 of the largest firms were divided between ten mutual 
funds, each firm having a 33% share owned by one fund and 3% of the shares distributed 
to each of the remaining nine funds. The remaining 40% of the firm was divided among 
the managers, workers' councils, and the government. Each Polish citizen received a share 
in each of the ten funds, and may trade or sell their fund shares. The funds may trade 
shares of firms, but their primary responsibility is to oversee the restructuring and attract 
foreign investment. Each firm now has a large shareholder that monitors its progress. It 
is important to recognize that the ownership structure of each firm was predetermined by 
the government. 
The Czech and Russian methods relied upon the distribution of vouchers or 
coupons. The coupons are redeemable for shares in privatized firms and were distributed 
at a small nominal cost. Coupons allowed individuals to choose what firms that they want 
to own, and the number of shares. Both countries also allowed managers to acquire 
ownership shares in their firms. The risk of coupon privatization is that ownership of 
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firms will be widely dispersed and that there will be no large shareholders to monitor and 
restructure the firms. To create large shareholders, the CR and Russia encouraged the 
formation of investment funds and blockholders. However, the methods differed between 
the two countries. Russia denominated its coupons in currency units, and the coupons 
were allowed to trade among investors. Allowing coupons to trade accomplishes several 
goals. First, it lets individuals who need cash, especially the poor, to sell their coupons for 
current consumption needs. Secondly, it helps create large blockholders. Finally it helps 
develop financial markets. The largest exchange in Russia dedicated a floor area to 
coupons as soon as they were introduced. The coupons were auctioned for shares at 
different locations throughout the country. This was primarily due to the vastness of the 
country and the number of people participating in coupon privatization. 
The Czech method created large shareholders by encouraging mutual funds, 
several of which have over I 0% of all coupons and own a significant share in many 
privatized firms. In addition, the Czech government took proposals from outsiders for 
restructuring in addition to proposals from managers. Proposals that included active 
blockholders were preferred and there was an average of four proposals for each firm 
privatized. The best proposal was selected, and if it was the coupon auction proposal, it 
was set aside for the coupon auction with all firms being auctioned at the same time. 
Coupons in the CR were not denominated in currency units, but in points, and 
were not allowed to trade. Individuals could divide their points between different firms 
and/or give them to investment funds to use in return for shares in the fund. Both 
individuals and funds participated in the coupon auction, and the auction was centralized. 
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Initially, three shares of every firm were valued at I 00 points. The Privatization Ministry 
took orders for shares at those prices. If the shares were greatly oversubscribed, then the 
orders were sent back, the prices for the shares in points were raised and new orders were 
taken. If the issue was greatly undersubscribed, then the orders for shares were sent back, 
the prices were lowered, and new orders were taken. The method for raising or lowering 
prices was not public, neither were the methods in determining which firms would be 
raised and lowered. There were five rounds of bidding in the Czech system. 
The auction process has several economic and political benefits. The auction 
process allocates shares to those that value them most, it produces a market valuation of 
companies, and it does not require politicians and bureaucrats to assign values to 
companies. Auctions are perceived to be much less susceptible to corruption and it gives 
individuals a choice in what shares to buy. Shares are allocated based on supply and 
demand, not on government determination. Political favors are harder to obtain because 
the auction is a market process, not an allocation by the state. Another benefit to this 
auction process is that professionals do not routinely outbid individuals. This type of 
auction also serves to reduce to some extent the initial underpricing (in valuing the firm, 
not the proceeds from sale) of privatization IPOs found by Perotti and Guney when 
countries use a fixed price offering. Through auctions, both the Russian and Czech 
methods achieved large blockholders in many firms, while allowing for varying ownership 
structures. 
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III. THE CZECH PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCE 
Czech Privatization Plans 
The Czech Republic (CR) had the greatest dependence on state owned enterprises 
of all former Soviet Bloc countries. At the time of the "velvet revolution" in 1989 that 
ended the communist rule over the republic, the private sector accounted for about 4% of 
the GNP, with about 98% of the property in state hands. In contrast, the private sector 
accounted for about 19% of output in Poland, and 35% in Hungary. The CR had a 
comparatively longer road to travel to reach a capitalistic system. 
The evolution from a SOE to private ownership has been dramatic. By the end of 
1994, about 80% to 85% of the Czech economy is in private hands. The CR boasts one 
of the lowest inflation and unemployment rates of the former Soviet Bloc countries at 
9.7% and 3.2% respectively. This is compared to 34.1% and 16.9% in Poland and 20.3% 
and 11.1 % in Hungary. In addition, the Czech Crown has remained stable and became 
convertible during 1995 (since 1990, the crown's value is determined by a U.S. Dollar-
German Mark mix). Some attribute these successes to the split between the CR and 
Slovakia which became final on December 31, 1992. The first wave of privatization was 
completed during 1992 before the split became finalized. After the split, the CR and 
Slovakia have pursued different privatization policies and plans. Slovakia drastically cut 
the number of firms to be privatized and increased the time frame of privatization. The 
CR continued with a quick, massive privatization plan, with a second auction completed in 
1994, and a final auction scheduled for 1996. After the second wave, 80 to 85% of the 
economy was privatized. 
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In the CR, privatized firms fell into either small scale privatization or large and 
medium scale privatization. Small scale privatization included about 25,000 firms that are 
mainly retail shops, restaurants, hotels, and service type shops. These firms were sold in a 
direct public auction to Czech and Slovak citizens. The auction for small scale 
privatization ended in 1993 with 22,212 firms privatized. 
Large scale privatization is mostly associated with the coupon system. Instead of a 
continual auction like that of small scale privatization, large scale privatization will be 
accomplished in three waves. At the beginning of each wave, interested individuals 
submitted proposals to the Privatization Ministry for firms scheduled to be privatized. For 
the first wave of privatizations that ended in 1992, there were 2, 170 SOEs selected to be 
privatized and proposals were accepted for these firms. Proposals ranged from coupon 
privatization, direct sales, transfer to local municipalities, or breaking up large firms into 
several small ones to be sold individually. The Privatization Ministry and the National 
Property Fund evaluated each proposal and selected a plan for each firm, or rejected all 
proposals and delayed privatization of the firm. About 300 of the targeted firms did not 
have suitable proposals and were not privatized in the first wave. The remaining 1,860 
SOEs were privatized during 1992. These firms represent about 40% of the large scale 
firms to be privatized in the CR The first wave of coupon auctions privatized 1,491 
SOEs. The rest were sold directly to foreign investors or privatized by other methods. 
For the SOEs sold to foreigners, the investors had to demonstrate some proof or give 
some assurances that this purchase represented a commitment to the Czech economy and 
not a method to buy assets cheaply and then dismantle the firm for its assets. 
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Volkswagen's lengthy negotiations with the Czech government and firm managers when 
buying Skoda is an example of this. The contract has since undergone renegotiations to 
settle problems that were not anticipated. In the first wave of privatization, 62% of shares 
were offered through coupon privatization, 15% were left in temporary possession of the 
National Property Fund, 11% of the shares were transferred to local municipalities, 4% 
were distributed for restitutional purposes. Less than 2% of shares each, 8% total shares, 
were for direct sales to foreign or domestic investors, intermediated sales, employee 
ownership, and long-term government holdings. 
A little over 80% of the eligible population participated in the first wave of coupon 
auctions. In order to be eligible to participate, the investor must be a citizen of the 
republic, over 18 years old, and pay a fee to buy the coupon points. The fee was 1,000 kc 
(about $35 U.S.), which represented about $1,250 in book value terms of the firms being 
privatized. As mentioned above individuals could bid for shares of firms directly with their 
coupon points or could allocate their points to an investment fund in return for shares in 
the fund. The investment fund would bid for shares in the auctions against other funds 
and individuals. Individuals could also divide their coupons between the two methods or 
between the funds. 
Initially, there were over 400 investment funds competing for coupon points. 
Some funds guaranteed a return of 1, 000% after the first year in order to attract points 
from investors. Investment funds managed to collect 72% of the points available. All 
funds were required to register and send out a prospectus that stated the objective and 
strategy of the fund. Some funds characterized themselves as a branch fund, investing in 
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SOEs that are from the same or related industries (such as the pivo (beer) fund), while 
others became growth funds, investing in high risk enterprises. Other funds stated their 
objective as a diversified and stable fund, buying a diversified portfolio with a small 
percentage in many firms and no large ownership stake, while others became management 
funds. Management funds sought to obtain a significant stake in relatively small number 
of firms in order to restructure and manage the firms. Funds were initially restricted to a 
20% or less ownership share of a firm, but could obtain a significant block ownership. 
Half the points accumulated by investment funds (36% of the total points) were controlled 
by the ten largest funds. 
None of the firms were restructured prior to privatization. The government did 
not restructure for several reasons. First, government management had been ineffective to 
this point, and there was no indication that it would increase the value of the firm. 
Secondly, the CR wanted to privatize as quickly as possible and did not want to delay 
privatization due to restructuring the corporation. Finally, the government wanted to rely 
upon the investment funds and the private sector to restructure the firms. Information 
about the firms being privatized was a major stumbling block. In order to help reduce 
information as~etry between informed and uninformed investors, the government 
published the list of enterprises to be privatized as well as information about each firm. 
The firms being privatized in the first wave of coupon auctions had a combined 
book value of$10.6 billion (average book value of$7,100,000). The average firm had a 
labor force of 850 employees. The first wave consisted of five rounds of bidding. The 
initial auction price in the first round for all shares was 3 shares/100 coupons. 
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Subscriptions were taken and then shares sold. If the firm was oversubscribed, then one 
of three outcomes occured: 1, shares were either pro-rated equally; 2, the investment 
funds' order was reduced by up to 20% per fund with a maximum of 25% of total sales; 3, 
no shares were sold and a new price was set for the next round. The condition of 
investment funds' orders being reduced was canceled for the second wave. If the shares 
were undersubscribed, then there were two outcomes: 1, the subscribed shares were sold 
at that price, or 2, no shares were sold and the price was lowered for the next round. No 
orders were filled only when there was a large over or under subscription. Prices for each 
round were computed using an algorithm by the committee for fixing prices based on 
orders and prices from the previous round. At the end of each round, the results were 
printed in the coupon privatization newspaper, This information included the number of 
shares offered in the round, the number sold (if any) and the new auction price for the next 
round. New orders were taken for the next round. Individuals or investment funds that 
had not used all of their coupons could bid for the next round. At the end of the third 
round, the highest price was 776 times the lowest price (in coupon points). By the end of 
the fifth round, 93% of all shares were sold, and 99% of all coupon points were used. 
There were 196 Czech firms ( 19. 8%) that sold all their shares in the five rounds of 
bidding. 
Although investment funds were intially limited to a 20% ownership of the firm, 
significant blockholdings above 20% could occur. Investment funds could petition to 
CKP for increased ownership above the maximum, especially in the later rounds when 
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most individuals had spent their coupons, or an investment company could take a family of 
funds approach and obtain a 20% ownership in a firm in each of its funds that it offers. 
The second wave of privatization was completed at the end of 1994. The second 
wave included 676 new firms and 185 firms which offered shares in the first wave 
(government selling a portion of its remaining shares). This compares to 988 firms in the 
first wave (the CR's share of the 1,491 after the split from Slovakia). The second wave 
concentrated mostly in complex and heavy industry firms, such as telecommunications, 
utilities, and machinery manufacturers. The third wave will be quite small compared to the 
first two waves and will be completed in 1996. 
With the mass privatization schemes of the CR, financial markets have developed. 
Some banks have been privatized and· are now operating as universal banks, providing 
underwriting of new issues and debt, commercial loans, and financial advising. An equity 
exchange market is also trading. The shares were physically distributed once the auction 
was completed. The Securities Center (SCP) kept records of the shares owned in account 
form. Investors received the physical shares that they owned in May and June 1993, and 
received the investment fund shares that they own between July 1994 and October 1994. 
All firms that had stock auctioned in the coupon privatization are traded on the Prague 
Stock Exchange. Because financial markets were relatively illiquid, changes in operations 
were more common than financial changes in the first year after privatization. Some 
financial backing was available from the state owned banks, but the loan process was 
similar to western loan applications and not the soft money policy during the communist 
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regime. Changes in operations were one of the stated objectives of the government for 
investment funds to accomplish. 
In addition to the traditional stock exchange, an electronic parallel off-exchange 
market had developed called the RMS (RM refers to the place where coupons were 
bought). The RMS will allow individuals to directly trade their shares, both firms that are 
listed on the exchange and firms that are not listed. Trading takes place without the 
mediation of brokers, but by computerized matches. RMS computer terminals are located 
in many different locations around the cities and the country. To trade, an investor must 
have the stock or cash on deposit in an account with a bank and/or the SCP. The records 
are electronically kept and settled. In addition to individuals, institutions also have direct 
access to the electronic exchange, but large block trades will take place outside the 
market. Trading began on the RMS in 1993. 
In summarizing the Czech experience, the mass privatization of large scale firms 
was successful in transferring ownership to private hands (individuals, investment funds 
and foreign investors). The privatization process allowed for varying ownership structures 
including large blockholders and numerous small investors. Cross-sectional differences in 
the resulting ownership structure provide a laboratory to test hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between ownership concentration and changes in efficiency and hypothese 
concerning market efficiency. 
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Czech Financial Markets 
With two waves of voucher privatization complete, Czech financial markets play 
an increasingly important role. In 1994, $2.22 billion traded on the PSE. 62% of the 
trades were shares of privatized firms, 7% in investment fund shares, and the remaining 
31 % in bond issues. After shares were issued and received, trading began in June 1993 on 
a weekly basis in a call market format. Shares began trading daily in 1994, and a limited 
number of the most active shares began trading continuously in February 1996. 
Both the PSE and RMS trade entirely by telecommunications. Although the PSE 
has a building and trading floor, trading is done by computer matches which the brokers 
submit from their own offices (beginning March 4, 1994) instead of placing the orders at 
the computer terminals located at the PSE. Trading is now done entirely on-line. The 
PSE trades listed and unlisted stocks. By the privatization laws, all shares are required to 
trade on exchanges. Listing with the PSE requires additional disclosure. The PSE will be 
allowed to trade only listed shares as over-the-counter markets become more developed 
and the massive privatization process is completed. The time frame for this switch is not 
definite. 
Trading on the PSE Central Market is a form of a call market, in which all shares 
trade once a day. Prices are established in the afternoon based on orders, supply and 
demand, and prices from the morning trades. These prices are valid until the next trading 
session. Orders are due by 10:00 a.m. for trading that day. Once buy and sell orders are 
received, trades occur by computer matches. From conversations with PSE officials, 
about 90% of the orders come in between 9:45 and 10:00 a.m. The efficiency of these 
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matches are categorized by number 1 through 8, 1 being the highest level of trade 
matches, 8 being no trade matches. The trading matches and the prices for the next 
trading session are released in the afternoon, generally by 1 :00 p.m. There are daily price 
limits on shares traded. Central Market trades can fluctuate± 5%. 
The PSE also has direct trading. Direct trading by brokers accounts for almost 
75% of volume and value on the PSE. For all practical purposes there are no price limits 
on direct trades. The last reported price limit in 1994 was± 25% of the previous days 
price. Direct trades are reported to the PSE and cleared by the PSE, but do not enter into 
the automated trading computer. 
The RMS is an alternative to trading shares on the PSE and is targeted toward 
small and individual investors, not institutions or block trading. During 1994, over 8.3 
million shares were traded at a value of 4.4 billion Czech Crowns ($170 million). Also 
during 1994, periodic trading of shares ended on the RMS in favor of continuous trading 
of shares. Trading can be done through one of356 special clients who have on-line 
terminals installed on their premises or through the Trading Places of the RMS ( offices 
that the RMS owns). Individuals can go in person to submit their order and wait for it to 
be processed at an RMS office, submit their orders on computer disk or by modem, or can 
submit their orders at a special client's office who has an RMS terminal. Before orders 
are executed, they are cleared by the investor's bank in case of a buy order, or with the 
SCP (where all stock accounts are kept) for a sell order. After the order is cleared by the 
investor's bank or the SCP, it becomes a valid order. In both the RMS and PSE, orders 
can be market orders, limit and/or stop orders. 
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The Czech markets utilize electronic trading in conjunction with technology with a 
frame of traditional markets as shown by trading on-line while having an exchange floor 
for trading. The views expressed by the Ministry of Finance while developing the markets, 
and the pride of the Czech markets is that since they have the technology and know how 
to create a state of the art trading system, why use traditional methods. These advances 
have had problems early, especially with the system requirements, such as hardware and 
managing the amount of orders and information. These problems have been solved for the 
most part, and the markets provide an opportunity to trade easily even though the markets 
are not as liquid as Western markets. 
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IV. DATA AND STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Data Requirements 
The data required to complete this study falls into three categories. The first is 
pre-privatization financial statements and privatization auction data, the second is post-
privatization financial statements and market value data, and the third is post-privatization 
ownership data. 
Data Sources. Pre-privatization financial statements and privatization auction data 
for the first wave oflarge-scale privatization was obtained from the Ministry of Finance. 
The Center for Coupon Privatization (CKP), a division of the Ministry of Finance, was 
responsible for the coupon privatization process. The CKP instructed the public on the 
process, the time frame, and provided information about companies in the auction and 
investment funds being· formed. The CKP also was responsible for the logistics of the 
privatization process. They accepted bids of coupons for shares, decided the number of 
coupons per share through the committee for fixing prices, and issued the shares to new 
owners held by the Securities Center in account form. Data were distributed to Czech 
citizens in the newspaper Kuponova Privatizace which was issued by the CKP. These 
were a series of newspapers, published monthly, over the privatization process that 
initially described the privatization process, updated the privatization process, listed the 
firms and information about these firms, and then reported the auction results and listed 
the new rates for the following round. The financial information for the firms in the 
coupon privatization was originally published in May 1992. The information that is used 
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in this study is that issue and also the collection of all data published in book form by the 
CKP. 
The pre-privatization information includes name, address, and brief description of 
business activities, the coupon identification number, the number of shares offered and the 
percentage of shares distributed by other methods. The additional methods include direct 
sale to a domestic or foreign entity, shares for restitution, shares temporarily left in the 
National Property Fund or Privatization Ministry, shares transferred to local 
municipalities, shares sold through intermediaries and shares held by the national 
government. Pre-privatization financial information includes: book equity value (book 
value of the issued shares), net business equity (assets), and the total liability of the firm as 
of 1991. The previous three years data, 1989, 1990, and 1991, for performance 
(revenue), profit, bank credit, and number of employees were also included. The firms 
were divided, by locale, into Czech or Slovak firms. There are a total of 988 Czech firms 
in the first wave of coupon privatization. 
As each round (five total) of the coupon auction for these firms occurred, 
Kuponova Privatizace published the number of shares sold, if any, the number left to sell, 
and the new price for bids in the next round. Data of how many shares were subscribed in 
each round, and the information about how to allocate shares and set the next round' s 
price were not disclosed to the public at any time during the privatization process. 
The second set of data that is required is the post-privatization financial 
information and the market price for these firms. Whereas the pre-privatization data was 
centrally located and collected, post-privatization data in the years immediately following 
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privatization are scarce. A central depository for annual reports of corporations, the SCP, 
was established by the Czech government. All corporations that are listed on the Prague 
Stock Exchange are required to produce and send their annual reports to the SCP. The 
format for the annual reports are laid out in the Accounting Act (1992) and the Chart of 
Accounts and Accounting Procedures (1993). But in 1993, only three firms sent annual 
reports to the SCP (Zelenka; 1995). Part of the reason for low compliance is the lack of 
enforcement or penalties. Another reason for low compliance is that some corporate 
officers still consider information in the annual reports to be private information. In 
addition to the SCP, summaries of the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts (income 
statement) are required to be published in the Commercial Bulletin which is published 
weekly. Most firms have.published their financial statements in the Commercial Bulletin. 
The financial statements in the Commercial Bulletin do not appear in any particular order, 
such as alphabetical, industry, or location, nor in any particular time frame such as end of a 
fiscal year, quarter, or month. Because of the difficulties in obtaining post-privatization 
financial data, the data that is used in this study were obtained from Aspekt K.ilcullen's 
database. Aspekt Kilcullen is a private business research and consulting firm which has 
collected full or partial information on over 1,400 firms, The data they collected ranges 
from financial accounting data on the firm, to personal information on the firm's directors 
and officers. Information was gathered by collecting annual reports, Commercial 
Bulletins, surveys sent to corporate officers, and information collected by the government. 
The financial data in the pre- and post-privatization periods are not directly 
comparable. The data from both periods are financial data and represent activities of the 
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firm. The data from the pre-privatization period are collected from the Office of Statistics 
which collected information to keep track of quotas given to the firm in a centrally 
planned economy. It reperesents firm activites, but not market demand or market financial 
information. This data differs from the post-privatization data in two ways: first, the 
post-privaization data is western accountind data that has been audited and is similar to 
U.S. financial statement data; second, the post-privatization data represents activities of 
firms in a market economy, not a centrally planned economy. Because of these reasons, 
the data is not directly comparable, but it does provide an imperfect measure of firm 
activities in the two time periods. 
Information on the market value of shares was collected from Harvard Brokerage 
Services (HBS) and from the financial newspaper Hospodarske Noviny. Harvard 
Brokerage is a private financial firm which provides consulting and investment banking 
services. In addition, HBS is part of the holding company Harvard Capital and Control 
which manages the Harvard Privatization Investment Funds. These are among the largest 
funds in the Czech Republic. HBS provided the price data for firms traded on the Prague 
Stock Exchange (PSE) during December 1993 and 1994. In December 1993, there were 
234 firms that traded on the PSE and 271 firms in December 1994. The average of this 
price data from December of each year determines the year end market value of the firms. 
The year end market value is used to measure a change in value from the auction data to 
the end of 1993 and from 1993 to the end 1994. The reason for using the average of the 
December prices is that the markets were not very liquid during this time and an average 
price will reduce the effects of illiquid trading. In 1993, trading took place two days a 
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week, in 1994, trading began on a daily basis, although only a limited number of firms 
traded weekly or daily. For firms not traded during these months, the last traded price 
listed on the PSE determines the market value. These prices are in the newspaper 
Hospodarske Noviny. 
The final set of data that is needed is ownership information, the name of the large 
blockholders and the percentage that they own. This information is not required 
disclosure in the annual reports. The database from Aspekt contains some ownership 
information for some firms. This information was generally gathered through surveys sent 
to the firm, not through annual reports. This is the most complete data on ownership in 
the Czech Republic. 
Sample Selection 
There are 988 Czech firms in the first wave of coupon privatization, along with 
503 Slovak firms. At the beginning of the first wave of coupon privatization, the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) still existed. It was not until January 1, 1993 that 
the two countries became completely independent of each other. During the first wave of 
privatization, Czech firms and Slovak firms were listed separately so that a distinction 
between firms could be made. This study begins with the sample of 988 Czech firms. 
Table I contains a summary of financial information for the firms. Of the 988 firms, 
Aspekt Kilcullen provided ownership information for 208 firms. A comparison of these 
208 firms with the remaining 780 is given in Table II. In general, the firms that provided 
ownership information are larger with respect to number of employees, sales, profit, and 
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assets than firms that did not provide ownership information. However, the two sub-
samples do not differ with respect to industry distribution or the price paid per share 
during privatization. 
Table I 
Descriptive Statistics of the 988 Privatized Firms from the 
Years 1989-1991 in thousands of Czech Crowns 
(29 .48Kc/$ average rate during 1991) 
Mean Standard Maximum Minimum 
Deviation 
Shares available 215,048 606,734 14,754,374 2,172 
Book value 351,611 1,719,925 49,181,248 2,239 
Net Business 
Equity (assets) 426,043 2,057,039 56,038,417 2,463 
Liabilities 312,983 1,013,115 13,932,252 -366,400 
Average 
performance 502,057 1,843,966 31,308,096 705 
Average profit 64,899 478,366 10,543,660 -105,818 
Average bank 
credit 150,496 601,820 12,290,165 8 
Average 
employees 1,024 2,016 36,593 9 
Weighted price 0.0622 0.0766 0.5887 0.0010 
Percent sold 0.9483 0.6340 1.0000 0.0738 
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Of the 208 firms with ownership information, thirteen firms are missing at least 
two years of pre-privatization financial data and twenty-three firms are missing both years 
of post-privatization financial data. These firms are deleted from the sample that is used in 
hypothesis testing in this study. These omitted firms do not statistically differ from the 
remaining 172 firms based on size of pre-privatization data on number of employees, 
assets or sales, nor do they differ by industry classification and coupon price of shares. 
Two more firms were deleted due to insufficient ownership information because they 
disclosed the names of the owners, but not the percentage of shares that they owned. The 
final sample contains 170 Czech firms. These are distributed across 16 broad Czech 
industry classifications, similar to SIC codes used in the U.S. 
Table II 
Comparison of Firms with Ownership Information with those 
with Missing Ownership Information 
·Firms with Ownership Firms without Ownership Mean 
Information {208 firms 2 Information {780 firms 2 Test 
Standard Standard 
Mean Median Deviation Mean Median Deviation T-ratio 
Book Value 755,040 203,380 3,603,921 248,576 93,939 597,884 2.02 
Net Business 
Equity 885,116 234,713 4,105,248 308,795 108,979 978,531 2.01 
Liabilities 622,461 141,406 1,708,845 233,233 50,632 714,450 3.20 
Average 
Performance 840,265 323,445 2,327,546 415,679 137,631 1,689,532 2.46 
Average Profit 121,070 27,135 750,099 50,606 10,126 378,806 1.31 
Average Bank 
Credit 297,439 62,472 1,137,955 109,656 28,959 311,041 2.36 
Average 
Employees 1,968 923 3,628 783 429 1,212 4.64 
Weighted 
Price 0.0604 0.0307 0.0634 0.0627 0.0308 0.0797 -0.44 
Percent Sold 0.9914 0.9660 1.0564 0.9373 0.9539 0.4692 0.72 
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Price Index 
An index was constructed to measure changes in relative value. A sample of 23 1 
firms was drawn randomly from the 780 firms excluded based on lack of ownership data 
(242 firms were initially used so that the index would have 450 in the index, but 11 firms 
did not have price information after privatizaiton). These firms were combined with the 
208 firms to construct the index. Pre-privatization data of the 231 firms is similar to the 
780 firms with respect to size and industry distribution and represent the excluded 
sample's change in value. The comparison of these firms with the remaining 549 firms is 
given in Table III, and, as can be seen, the firms selected to be in the market index are 
representative of the 780 firms with respect to size and industry classification. 
Table III 
Descriptive Statistic Comparison of Firms Used to Create Index and Firms 
Not Included in Sample 
Firms Used in Index Non Sample Firms Mean 
{231 firms} {549 firms} Test 
Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard 
Deviation Deviation T-ratio 
Book Value 279,116 100,083 728,599 235,653 90,000 533,254 0.82 
Net Business 
Equity 308,727 112,560 807,384 308,824 104,485 1,043,203 -0.00 
Liabilities ,251,425 58,207 745,885 222,986 47,317 697,668 0.49 
Average 
Performance 285,456 138,647 403,287 470,782 137,631 1,996,422 -2.08 
Average Profit 29,343 9,564 59,891 59,512 10,188 449,758 -1.54 
Average Bank 
Credit 118,066 25,406 329,131 94,213 21,083 287,783 1.91 
Average 
Employees 733 438 915 802 425 1,317 -0.84 
Weighted Price 0.0699 0.0312 0.0916 0.0596 0.0306 0.0739 1.51 
Percent Sold 0.9156 0.9527 0.1153 0.9465 0.9553 0.5546 -1.24 
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Pre-privatization Prices. In order to measure a change in relative value from the 
privatization coupon price to market prices in Czech crowns, an index was created. The 
index of 439 firms represents the market of traded Czech firms. For each of the 439 firms, 
a weighted coupon privatization priceis computed using the following formula: 
where Pc is the weighted average coupon price, ni is the number of shares sold each round, 
Ci is the coupon price for each round and i is the auction round. A weighted coupon price 
is used because the coupon price for each firm changed each round, depending if the 
firm's shares were oversubscribed or undersubscribed at the previous price. For the post-
privatization market price, the price is the average weekly traded prices for December of 
1993 and 1994. Weekly prices are used because trading was done weekly in 1993 and 
only a few stocks on the PSE were traded on a daily during 1994. For stocks not traded 
during December 1993 or 1994, the last PSE price is used to determine market value. Of 
the 208 firms in the sample with ownership information, 88 firms traded in December 
1993 and 89 firms traded in December 1994. Over 42% of sample firms traded during 
these time periods. For the other firms in the index, 48 and 49 firms traded during 
December 1993 and 1994, respectively. This about 21% of the nonsample firms in the 
index. As previously mentioned, the firms that did not trade used the last trading price on 
the PSE which is found in Hospodarske Noviny. 
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Equally Weighted Index. From these market prices, equally weighted and value 
weighted indices were created to measure changes in relative market values. The equally 
weighted index value is computed as the sum of the price of each of the 439 shares, 
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I E,t = LPt.i. IE,t is the equally weighted index for period t (1992, 1993 and 1994) and 
f=I 
pr,t is the price of each individual firm at time t. The relative value for each firm is 
V = P1.1 
1.1 I 
E,t 
Value Weighted Index. The value weighted index, and therefore the relative 
weighted price is computed similarly to the equally weighted index, but differentiates by 
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firm size. The value weighted index is: lv.r = LPi.,nf,t, where Iv,t is the value weighted 
f=I 
index at time t, nr,t is the number of outstanding shares of firm fat time t and Pr.t is defined 
as above. The relative value of the firm is V1.1 = pf.tnf.t using the value weighted index. 
lv,1 
Change in Tax Code 
The pre-privatization and post-privatization accounting data used in this study are 
not directly comparable. In 1992, the Czech government instituted a new tax code that 
included an income tax and a value added tax (VAT) for corporations beginning in 1993. 
There are two main effects of these changes on the data analyzed in this study. The first is 
that the taxes will reduce net income. The second is that the VAT will increase prices. 
49 
The current VAT is 42% on most consumer goods. If these taxes are passed on directly 
to the consumer, it would lead to a 42% increase in inflation. The VAT is believed to be a 
major factor that caused inflation. At the same time as the institution of the VAT, prices 
were liberalized and the currency was tied to a basket of hard currencies. Because of the 
simultaneous introduction of these policies, it is difficult to determine how much inflation 
the VAT caused in the economy. 
To correct for the net income effect, the reported tax expenses are added back to 
net income for 1993 and 1994 to calculate income before taxes. Income before taxes will 
be used in comparison of operating performance and in the analysis of post-privatization 
performance. 
Statement of Hypotheses and Methods 
Hypothesis 1. Perotti and Guney ( 1993) and MNR ( 1994) examine changes in 
operating efficiency from the pre-privatization to the post-privatization period. They find 
that firms increase operating efficiency after privatization. Their previous research did not 
include former Soviet Bloc countries, which are different, both in structure and 
environment than the SOEs of western economies. If privatized firms are more efficient 
than SOEs, then we should find an overall increase in operating efficiency all else equal. 
The first hypothesis tests the overall effect of privatization on operating 
performance. 
Hl: Operating efficiency and profitability ratios should be better for the post-
privatization period (a) than the pre-privatization period (b). Specifically: 
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Net Income Efficiency (NIE)= Net Income I Number of Employees 
NIE. >NIEb 
Real Net Income Efficiency (RNIE) = Real Net Income I Number of Employees 
RNIE. > RNIEb 
Sales Efficiency (SE)= Sales (performance) I Number of Employees 
SE.> SEb 
Real Sales Efficiency (RSE) = Real Sales (performance)/ Number of Employees 
RSE.>RSEb 
Return on Assets (ROA)= Net Income I Total Assets 
ROA.>RO~ 
Return on Sales (ROS)= Net Income I Sales (performance) 
ROS.>ROSb 
Real Sales (RS)= Nominal Sales (performance)/ CPI Deflator 
RS.>RSb 
Level of Employment = Number of Employees 
Employment. ? Employmentb, 
where net income in the post-privatization is net income before taxes as described above. 
Each of these hypotheses will be tested using a Wilcoxon nonparametric matched pair, 
sign rank test. This method was used by MNR, and· a similar test of positive changes were 
used in MNR and Muscarella and Vetsuypens' test of reverse LBOs. Test results are 
presented in Table IV in the next chapter. 
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Methodology. In the Wilcoxon test, the differences in one sample are observed 
over time. Let Yi be an observation of the average of the efficiency ratio on the ith firm in 
the post-privatization period, and Xi be the observation in the pre-privatization. Then 
To test the differences, Di, define the signed rank, Ri, for (Xi, Yi) as: 
R = the rank assigned to (Xi, Yi) if Di is positive 
Ri = the negative of the rank assigned to (Xi, Yi) if Di is negative. 
The test statistic is: 
n 
Li\ 
T=~i='=1== 
~t.~' 
If T is significantly different from zero, the hypothesis is rejected. 
The first seven measures of efficiency are expected to increase after privatization. 
The expected change in employment is ambiguous. Previous studies have shown that 
there is an increase in operating efficiency. Often this occurs due to a smaller labor force, 
but l\1NR find that employment levels increase. In the former communist countries, SOEs 
often employed people that did not serve any function in the firm, but were there only to 
achieve full employment in the economy. One way that CR firms may achieve operating 
efficiency is by decreasing inputs (Al-Obdian and Scully (1991)) such as reducing 
employment. If the number of employees is less than before privatization, then 
management did not implement a structural change in operating efficiency as much as 
management eliminated the government's employment quotas. 
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Hypothesis 2. The relationship between ownership structure (concentration) and 
operating efficiency is examined with this data. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) proxied 
ownership concentration as the percentage of the firm owned by the five and by the twenty 
largest shareholders. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) looked only at percentage of the 
firm held by insiders. This study will use an adapted version ofDemsetz and Lehn's 
definition of ownership concentration by using the percentage of shares owned by the 
three largest shareholders. The reason for choosing this definition is that in the CR 
privatization scheme, it is highly unlikely that the largest shareholders will be managers or 
members of the board of directors, but more likely to be the investment funds. 
Both of the previous studies test the relationship of ownership concentration and 
firm value. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny use Tobin's Q as a proxy for firm value while 
Demsetz and Lehn use accounting profit rate. Tobin's Q cannot be obtained for these 
firms and the accounting profit rate will not fully capture the reorganization effects after 
privatization. Instead of these two variables, this study will use the ratios identified in 
hypothesis one that measure changes in the firm's efficiency and profitability. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
changes in operating efficiency and profitability ratios ( as defined in 
HI.). 
Methodology. This hypothesis will be tested using seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) methodology. There are 6 equations (M=6) in the system of equations. 
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Y 1.t = /3 nX11,1 + /312X1t,2 + ... + /3 1kX1t,k + s 1,1, 
Y 2,1 = p 21X2t,1 + /3 22X2t,2 + ... + p 2tkX2t,k + s 2,t, 
Y m,t = /3 m!Xmt,1 + P m2Xmt,2 + ... + P mk.Xmt,k + 6 m,t, 
where Y m,t is the percentage change in operating efficiency, m, for the firm, Xm,1 are the 
explanatory variables, Bm.k are the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables. To 
prevent colinearity, RNIE and RSE are not used in this system of equations. The SUR 
system is used when the errors are correlated or if the dependent variables are related in 
each equation. In this study, there are several measures of operating efficiency used. One 
ratio will not capture all of the operating changes in the firm. The ratios used in this study 
are related by accounting identities and should be tested using SUR. In addition the same 
explanatory variables are used in each equation. Using a SUR system will produce 
consistent estimates if the error terms are correlated. In the presence of uncorrelated error 
terms, the SUR system is equivalent to estimating each equation independently using 
ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Ownership concentration's effect on changes in operating efficiency are defined 
and tested in a piecewise regression similar to that of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny. The 
percentage of the three largest shareholders is used to determine the pivot points for the 
piecewise regression ownership variables. The boundaries for ownership structure are 
determined after the ownership data is analyzed, but are more likely to be larger than what 
previous studies have found because of the structure of the Czech market. These 
piecewise regressions will be able to better define the relationship between ownership 
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structure, changes in operating efficiency and firm value. While ownership concentration 
influences operating performance, other factors will also influence operating performance. 
These factors are included as control variables in the regression. These variables are firm 
size, government ownership, foreign ownership, and industry specific factors have all been 
shown to affect market valuation of firms. A size effect has been noted by Banz ( 1981) 
and Reigmanan (1981) in a market return and risk. Fama and French (1992) also found 
that firm size explains firm value. In organizational structure changes, a smaller firm may 
be easier to restructure because it is easier to control. 
Government and foreign ownership will also affect restructuring and firm value. 
Perotti and Guney found that significant but non-controlling interest by the government 
signifies a commitment to the success of privatization of the firm. Foreign investment 
needs to be included because firms with foreign investors are more likely to have new 
capital or resources invested in the firm, or a transfer of new technology to the firm from 
western countries from their foreign investors. 
Controlling for industry effects is also important. Firms that are capital intensive 
will be more difficult to restructure immediately due to relatively large fixed costs as 
compared to labor intensive industries. Another industry factor that is important is the 
type of product that the firms produce. An example is the Czech defense industry. The 
former Czechoslovakian republic produced many of the tanks, light weapons and 
ammunition for the former Soviet Army. With the market for these buyers gone, the 
defense industry has suffered more than other industries because the technology and 
products are not easily transferred to goods demanded in the open world market. In 
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addition, international pressure to stop selling military goods to third world countries has 
also stunted the growth and profitability of these firms. 
A final variable controlling for agency costs of debt or the effects of financing 
decisions on operating performance the percentage of debt that the firm has. The changes 
in the financial structure of these firms in the two years following privatization are 
expected to be small since capital markets are not yet fully functioning, but changes in 
financial structure of the firms will change the agency costs to these firms resulting from 
debt. Since these. agency costs are outside the scope of this study, controls for changes in 
financial structure are needed. 
Hypothesis 2a. Another test of ownership's effect on changes in operating 
efficiency is a nonparametric test of differences in changes in efficiency in firms with 
different types of owners. Some investment funds actively managed the firms that they 
owned while other funds are passive. The firms that have active investment funds as one 
of their owners should have a larger positive change in operating efficiency. According to 
the Ministry ofFinance's department of Capital Market Supervision, there are only three 
funds that register as pure management investment funds, but there are other investment 
funds that do supervise the management of the firms that they own. To proxy for funds 
that supervise their firms, the sample is divided into firms that have at least one of the 
thirteen largest investment funds as one of their three largest shareholders and firms that 
do not. The thirteen largest investment funds own 70% of the shares owned by all 
investment funds. This translates into roughly 50% of the shares auctioned in the first 
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wave of coupon privatization. Because of their size and ownership in many firms, they 
have the power to either directly supervise and change management because of their 
ownership or indirect power through their influence in the market. This leads to another 
hypothesis about the relationship between ownership and changes in operating efficiency: 
H2a: Firms that have one of the 13 largest investment funds as large blockholders 
will have greater inprovement in operating efficiency and profitability ratios than 
firms that do not have one of these funds as owners. Specifically: 
SE1> SEo 
ROA1>ROAo 
ROS1>ROS0 
RS1>RS0 
where the subscripts land o signify a large investment fund and other, respectively. 
Methodology. The Mann-Whitney rank test tests the differences in two samples' 
means. Let Xi be the subsample of firms with a large investment fund ownership and Yj be 
firms with no large fund ownership. If there are no or just a few ties in ranking the 
n 
samples as one sample then the test statistic is: T = L R(X;) . 
i=i 
If there are many ties in rank, then the test statistic is: 
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T-nN+l 
2 I; = -;::========== 
nm f R;2 _ nm(N + 1) 2 
N(N -1 i=l 4(N -1) 
where m and n are the number of firms in each subsample and N is the total number of 
firms. The critical value for this test is computed using Mann-Whitney test statistics 
whose values have been computed and are located in tables or can be computed for larger 
samples. There are ninety firms in the sample of 170 that have ownership by at least one 
of the thirteen largest investment funds. 
Hypothesis 3. The third hypothesis is that ownership concentration and the value 
of the changes in operating performance are reflected in the changes in the market price of 
the firms. The theoretical arguments presented by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show a 
relationship between firm value and a large blockholder. They state for outside 
blockholder ownership under 50%, and when the jawboning mechanism and takeover 
mechanisms are available, the market value of the firm rises with percentage owned by the 
outside blockholder. The results ofBrous and Kini (1994), Bathala, Moon, and Rao 
(1994), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find 
a relationship between ownership and value. If ownership does affect changes in 
operating efficiency and firm value and the Czech markets use this information to 
determine firm value, a relationship between ownership concentraton and firm value 
should exist for Czech firms. 
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Testing for a change in value of these firms is not a direct test. Shares were 
initially sold to their owners for coupons, which were basically free, but limited in 
quantity. A relative price in coupons was established by the auction process. Having 
informed investors in the form of investment funds bid for these shares assures that the 
"prices" reflect a value based on the information available. Due to the auction process and 
the existence of informed investors such as the investment funds, there should not be any 
firms that were sold for substantially more or less than the relative value established in 
coupons. The evidence for this is that 99% of the coupons were used and 93% of the 
available shares were sold. This indicates some degree of efficiency because the shares 
were allocated in such a way that most coupons and shares were allocated in the auction 
using a market mechanism. The price spread of 776 times the lowest price to the highest 
price indicates a degree of separation that reflects valuation of firms by participants in the 
market. 
Firms privatized wholly or in part by coupon privatization must be listed on the 
Prague Stock Exchange and can be traded there or on the electronic RMS trading system. 
Currently, these shares are traded in the market which is still considered illiquid by U.S. 
standards, but a market value in currency price are established. Relative values and 
relative price changes can be determined as described earlier based on the market values 
and the value the shares initially sold for in coupons. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the changes in operating 
efficiency and profitability and changes in the relative value of the firm. 
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This hypothesis will be tested using a pooled cross-sectional, time series regression 
with the same explanatory variables used in second hypothesis. In addition to using 
ownership concentration, size, debt, government and foreign ownership, and an industry 
variable, changes in operating ratios will also be included as explanatory variables for 
changes in relative value. 
Methodology. In the third hypothesis, the change in relative value is regressed 
against the independent variables to measure market efficiency. Using just the change in 
prices cannot be used because the coupon price is not a currency price and measuring a 
change in price based only on coupon price between 1992 and 1993 is not possible. 
The pooled cross-sectional, time series test that will be used to test the third 
hypothesis takes the general form of: 
Yi,t = p 1Xi1,1 + P 2X1,2 + ... + p ik.Xit,k + c i,t, 
where Yit are·the changes in relative value of the ith firm for time t, Xit are the explanatory 
variables, which were used in SUR estimation in addition the changes in operating 
efficiency measures, and Pk are the estimated coefficients for the independent variables. 
Time, t = 1 or 2, is just two periods representing the two full years of operations after 
privatization in 1992. 
Summmy 
These three hypotheses test the effects of privatization on changes in operating 
efficiency, the effects of ownership concentration and type of owner on changes in 
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operating efficiency, and the effect of ownership concentration and changes in efficiency 
on firm value. The final sample of 1 70 Czech firms consists of 1 7% of the number of 
firms privatized in the first wave of coupon privatization. Nonparametric and parametric 
techniques are used to test these hypotheses. The methods are based upon previous 
research of similar topics. The following chapter presents the results of these tests and an 
explanation of the results. 
61 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Effects of Privatization 
Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994) show that post-privatization 
operating efficiencies, as measured in part by net income efficiency, sales efficiency, return 
on assets, return on sales, and employment, improves. A univariate analysis of the Czech 
Republic's experience is presented in Table IV. The nonparametric Wilcoxon T test and 
the parametric t-test of the differences in means of a single sample. As Table IV shows, in 
most measures, the post-privatization period average efficiency decreased from the pre-
privatization period averages. 
Table IV 
Tests of Mean Differences in Efficiency Ratios in Pre- and Post-
Privatization periods: Wilcoxon Ranked· One Sample 
Matched Pair Test and t-test for 
Paired Sample Means 
Mean Nonparametric Parametric 
Efficiency Pre- Post- Wilcoxon p-value T-Ratio 
Ratio erivatization erivatization T {one taiQ 
NIE 57.34 50.38 -2:87 0.003 -0.64 
RNIE 43.14 22.97 -6.49 0.001 -3.55 
SE 476.42 976.20 9.07 0.001 5.51 
RSE 371.78 439.99 0.54 0.704 1.59 
ROA 0.0900 0.0440 -7.13 0.001 -6.62 
ROS 0.1204 0.0442 -7.57 0.001 -4.40 
RS 680956 536052 -7.27 0.001 -3.69 
EMP 1996 1214 -11.20 0.001 -6.17 
NIE: Net Income Efficiency= Net Income I Number of Employees 
RNIE: Real Net Income Efficiency= Real Net Income I Number of Employees 
SE: Sales Efficiency= Sales (performance) I Number of Employees 
RSE: Real Sales Efficiency= Real Sales (performance)/ Number of Employees 
ROA: Return on Assets = Net Income I Total Assets 
ROS: Return on Sales = Net Income I Sales (performance) 
RS: Real Sales = Nominal Sales (performance)/ CPI Deflator 
EMP: Level of Employment= Number of Employees 
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p-value 
{one tail} 
0.261 
0.000 
0.000 
0.057 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
The test ~hows that average employment decreased by 782 persons from an pre-
privatization period average to the post-privatization period. This is consistent with the 
notion that state firms were over-employed in order to help the country reach the goal of 
full employment. Even with the large decrease in employment, the net income and real net 
income efficiency ratios were significantly lower than before privatization. This 
demonstrates that even though the level of employment decreased, it still did not to 
improve efficiency. The firm did not make operational changes such as lowering other 
costs or increasing output, to make the firm more efficient. Other measures of efficiency 
changes will determine which changes the firm made after privatization. 
The measure for sales efficiency improved significantly while the measure for real 
sales efficiency did not change significantly. The significant rise in sales efficiency was 
caused by the high inflation in the economy which increased nominal sales and the 
significant decrease in employment during this period. After accounting for inflation, real 
sales efficiency did not change significantly. The consumer price index for 1991 rose 
57.8% to 177.2, and was 196.2, 210.4, 231.6 in 1992, 1993, and 1994, respectively. 
Inflation was brought about by the introduction of the value added tax (VAT), price 
liberalization, and the limited convertibility of the currency. Real sales efficiency measured 
no significant difference between the two periods. 
The real net income efficiency, real sales efficiency, and employment levels indicate 
that employment decreased to a level to maintain the pre-privatization level of efficiency, 
but that operational changes did not take place and actually decreased profitability. This is 
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emphasized by significant decrease in return on assets and return on sales between the two 
periods. 
In the years immediately following the first wave of coupon privatization, the firms 
on the whole decreased labor, but failed to improve operational efficiency and profitability 
as measured by these eight ratios. This test is a noisy measure of changes in operational 
efficiency and profiatblility beacause of the differences in the data discussed in the 
previous chapter. Even with the noise, it is clear that there was a decrease in efficiency 
after privatization. The decrease in efficiency is not necessarily due to privatization. 
Previous studies uniformly show the positive effect of privatization on the firm. The 
decrease in efficiency is due to the shcock caused by a change in the economic system. 
The firms before privatization were given quotas on what to produce and the quantity to 
produce with a guarantee of a buyer at the end of production. After the change to a 
market economy, the system of production and markets changed leaving the firms with no 
direction on operations. This change in economic systems greatly contributed to the 
decrease in efficiency after privatization. 
A privatization process and a switch to a market economy from a planned 
economy does not automaticly improve the firm. The change in ownership provides an 
opportunity for the firm to respond to market forces and restructure, but the 
implementation of a market economy does not improve efficiency immediately. The 
market is not fully functioning and there must be other factors that influence a firm's 
behavior after privatization. Ownership concentration in the form of large outside 
blockholders is one of these factors. 
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Ownership Concentration and Changes in Efficiency 
The Czech Republic provides a unique opportunity to test the effect of ownership 
concentration on changes in operating efficiency. As previously mentioned, almost 1,000 
firms were privatized at the same time, each having its new ownership determined during 
the coupon privatization through the bidding of investment funds and individuals. Each 
firm has a different ownership sturcture, with different levels of ownership concentration 
and different owners. · The new owners took on the resposibility of continuing the 
operations of the firm and also making improvements in operating efficiency and 
profitability. 
Shleifer and Vishny ( 1986) present a theoretical model that predicts an increase in 
firm value with the increase in ownership by a large outside blockholder. In the case of 
the CR, the large outside blockholders are the in:vestment funds. The results of several 
recent studies by Brous and Kini (1994), Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994), Park and Song 
(1995), and Shome and Singh (1995) all find that a large outside blockholder increases the 
value of the firm. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) also 
test the effects of ownership concentration on firm value. Demsetz and Lehn test a 
straight linear relationship, but Morck, Shleifer and Vishny test a piecewise regression 
relationship. 
This study tests the relationship of ownership structure and changes in operating 
efficiency using the ownership concentration of the three largest blockholders using a 
piecewise regression similar to that of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny. The percentage of 
ownership of the three largest shareholders was computed . Ownership concentration was 
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then divided into either high ownership levels (HOWN), moderate levels of ownership 
(MOWN) and low levels of ownership (LOWN). This model allows for differing effects 
of ownership based on its concentration, not just a single linear relationship. The 
percentages of ownership that serve to define the ownership variables are tested using 
three different models. The model that is reported, Model 2, in the following tables 
defines these variables as: 
LOWN 
MOWN 
HOWN 
= percentage of three largest shareholders if < 35%, 
= 35%, if percentage of three largest shareholders> 35%; 
= 0, if percentage of three largest shareholders< 35%, 
= percentage of three largest shareholders minus 3 5%, if 
35% < percentage of three largest shareholders< 60%, 
= 25%, if percentage of three largest shareholders > 60%; 
= 0, if percentage of three largest shareholders< 60%, 
= percentage of three largest shareholders minus 60%, if 
percentage of three largest shareholders> 60%. 
These definitions are similar to the methodolgy of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny except for 
the levels of concentration used to divided the variables. For Model 2, there are 30 
LOWN firms, 82 MOWN firms and SS·HOWN firms. 
Two additional definitions of ownership are used. Model I computes LOWN, 
MOWN, and HOWN using the same method as above, but with changes in slope, or 
"breaks," at 30% and 50%. Model 3 computes the ownership variables with breaks at 
40% and 70%. As mentioned earlier, the reason for these much larger ownership 
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variables is because of the investment fund dominance in the coupon auction process. The 
average percentage of stock that the three largest owners held was 54.38% while the 
median value was 48.67%. The maximum percentage held for this sample of firms by the 
three largest owners is 100% and the minimum is 18.93%. 
The control and additional explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
LASS = the log of the firm's asset value, 
DEBT = the firms debt ratio, total debt/total assets, 
FC = 1 if the firm has foreign capital, 0 otherwise, 
N = 1 if the firm has a joint venture, 0 otherwise, 
Ind 16 = 1, if the Czech industry classification is 16, services, 0 otherwise, 
Ind 14 = 1, if the Czech industry classification is 14, trade, 0 otherwise, 
Ind 12 = 1, if the industry classification is 12, utilities, 0 otherwise, 
Ind 11 = 1, if the industry classification is 11, electrical engineering, 0 otherwise, 
Ind 10 = 1, if the industry classification is 10, mechanical engineering, 0 
otherwise, 
Ind 9 = 1, if the industry classification is 9, metallurgy, 0 otherwise, 
Ind 8 = 1, if the industry classification is 8, construction, 0 otherwise, 
Ind 6 = 1, if the industry classification is 6, wood and paper, 0 otherwise, 
DOC = the percentage of shares temporarily left in the National Property Fund, 
POZ = special voting rights, such as veto power by the government. 
ZPR = the percentage of shares sold through intermediaries, 
PPT = the percentage of shares sold directly to a domestic investor, 
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OBC = the percentage of shares transferred to local governments and 
municipalities, 
RES = the percentage of shares reserved for restitution claims, 
TRV = the percentage of shares which the government holds because of direct 
interests, 
PPZ = the percentage of shares sold directly to a foreign investor. 
The variable LASS is used as a control variable to account for the size effects that 
have been reported in previous studies such as Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1992). 
DEBT is a control variable for other agency and monitoring problems, as well as a 
variable to account for financing arrangements and ch~ges in the financial structure. The 
variables FC and N are included to account for differential effects of western expertise 
and capital. Industry dummy variables follow the Czech classification system. Some 
industry classifications were not included because of the small number of firms in those 
industries. These effects will be included as part of the constant term. 
The remaining control variables, DOC, POZ, ZPR, PPT, OBC, RES, TRV, and 
PPZ are alternative share distributions. Some of these, such as OBC, TRV, DOC, and 
RES indicate gov~rnment involvement with the firm after privatization, at least in the 
short-run. OBC and TRV are long-term government holdings after privatization. Other 
variables such as PPT, PPZ, and ZPR indicate the effects of other types of sales, to a 
foreign investor or a strong domestic investor. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and changes in operating efficiency are tested in a Seemingly Unrelated 
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Regression (SUR) system. The reason for using the SUR is because the dependent 
variables (changes in operating efficiency) are related by accounting identities. The SUR 
uses this additonal information and the correlation of the errors terms to improve 
estimation of the independent variables. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
confirms that the SUR system is appropriate and well specified. This test tests for a 
diagonal covarince matrix. If the hypothesis of a diagonal covariance matrix is rejected, 
then the data exhibits contemporaneous correlation and the SUR system is used. The 
Breusch-Pagan test statistic is: 
M i-1 
A= NL Lr/ 
i=2 J=I 
where, M is the number of equations in the SUR, N is the number of observations and r;J 
is the squared correlation coefficient of residuals. The test statistic is distributed chi-
square with M(M-1)/2 degrees of freedom. For Model 2, the test statistic is 210.77 with 
15 degrees of freedom. The hypothesis of a diagonal covariance matrix can be rejected at 
the . 01 significance level. The SUR is the appropriate model. 
The independent variables are the ownership variables as defined above and the 
control variables. All of the control variables are the same for each model, and all the 
explanatory variables are the same for each dependent variable in the SUR system in each 
model. The results are first discussed for each dependent variable (change in efficiency) 
equation in the SUR system, and then summarized when the SUR is discussed as a whole 
system with a discussion of the results. A summary table of results is given in Tables Vla 
and VIb at the end of the section. 
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SUR Estimates for Each Dependent Variable. With respect to the results for 
Model 2, Table Va through Table Vfreport the estimated coefficients, the standard error, 
the t-statistic, and the p-value for each of the dependent variables. The results are 
discussed separately for each dependent variable. The estimates for the change in net 
income efficiency are shown in Table Va. The ownership variables demonstrate a change 
in slope related to ownership concentration. For low levels of ownership, there is a 
positive relationship to changes in net income efficiency, but for moderate levels of 
ownership the relationship is negative at a significance level of 0.05. To a lesser extent, 
high ownership concentration also has a positive impact on net income efficiency. This 
indicates that a moderate ownership structure does not help the firm in restructuring 
operations such as controlling costs and operating efficiency. The effects are compounded 
by the size of the firm. The larger the size of the firm, the greater the negative impact on 
net income efficiency, but the presence of an outside partner in the form of a joint venture 
does increase the firms change in net income efficiency. 
The results for the changes in sales efficiency are reported in Table Vb. The 
ownership effects for change in sales efficiency are opposite from what they were for 
changes in net income efficiency. Lower ownership concentration reduces sales efficiency, 
while moderate concentration increases efficiency. In both cases, high ownership 
concentration ( above 65%) does not have a statistically significant effect at the 5% level. 
The reversal of effects of ownership from net income efficiency to sales efficiency cannot 
be explained without looking at the entire system as a whole, or additional information 
about the employees of these firms. The SUR system will be discussed as a whole later in 
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the paper, but the link between sales, net income and employees explains the difference of 
ownership levels on net income efficiency and sales efficiency. 
The other control variables are also interesting. As in the change in net income 
efficiency, asset size, log of assets (LASS), has a significantly negative effect on sales 
efficiency. This indicates that firm size does pl~y an important role in the restructuring of 
privatized firms and that the larger the firm, the more difficult to restructure. Another 
interesting finding is from the industry variables. The utilities industry has a significant 
increase in sales efficiency, which is expected. If the level of utility sales are generally the 
same from year to year, with slight fluctuations, a decrease in the labor force will increase 
the sales efficiency if sales remain stable. The same can be true for the building industry, 
especially with the a constant flow of contracts from the government for construction or 
renovation of buildings. Firms with shares in the long-term government holdings 
decreased sales efficiency, but those that are temporarily left in government possession 
increased this ratio. A possible explanation of this is that firms that will be sold later are 
more aggressive in increasing sales so that the firm will be more marketable. This 
incentive does not exist for firms that have a significant long-term interest. 
The results for the changes in return on assets portion of the SUR system are 
reported on Table V c. An interesting result in the ownership variables occurs when taken 
in light of the previous two efficiency ratio results. In spite of a decreasing net income 
efficiency with moderate ownership levels, there is a positive change in return on assets. 
This would occur if net income increased over the post-privatization period, therefore 
increasing return on assets, but the level of employees the firm has increased as well. High 
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ownership levels have a significant negative effect on the change in the return on assets, 
indicating that the net income for these firms decreased. 
When looking at control variables, the size of the firm is again a negative influence 
on changes in efficiency. This is not surprising in the measure ofthis ratio. Foreign 
partners and capital have a positive effect on the change in return on assets. Outside 
expertise helps firms use their assets more effectively. Within the industry variables, the 
services industry (Ind 16) have a significantly positive change in return on assets. This is 
probably due to the relatively low level of assets that service industry firms utilize. Firms 
with shares left in government holdings, both long-term and short-term have a significantly 
negative change in return on assets. In addition, firms with intermediated sale of shares 
and firms that were sold directly to domestic investors also have a significantly negative 
change in return on assets. 
The next equation of the SUR system is the change in return on sales and the 
results are reported in Table Vd. Of the ownership level variables, only the moderate 
classification is significant and it is negative. This would be caused by an increase in sales 
without an increase in net income, or a decrease in net income. Given the significantly 
negative effect on net income efficiency, it is probable that firms with a moderate 
ownership level tend to focus on sales and not as much on the operations of the firm. In 
the control variables, LASS is again significantly negative. In the industry variables, the 
utilities industry has a positive effect on the change in return on sales, but mechanical 
engineering firms have a significantly negative effect. 
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In incorporating inflation into the way the firms restructure, the change in real 
sales helps explain some of the overall changes. These results are shown in Table Ve. 
Moderate ownership variables have a significantly positive effect on changes in real sales, 
but low and high ownership concentration have a significant negative effect. This would 
continue to lend support to the notion that firms in the Czech Republic with moderate 
ownership concentration levels focus on increasing sales immediately following 
privatization. The presence of foreign capital has a positive effect on real sales, but the 
engineering firms, both electrical and mechanical have a negative effect. This may indicate 
an decreased demand for these services and skills, or a pricing schedule that does not keep 
pace with inflation. 
Long-term government interest has a negative effect on the change in real sales. 
This is in contrast to firms with local government holdings and with firms temporarily left 
in the NPF that will be sold later. The fact that local government improves real sales and 
long-term national government decreases real sales indicates that the national government 
does not provide the best monitoring arrangement, or that the national government 
systematically holds companies that will underperform. 
The last measure of efficiency changes that is tested in the SUR is the changes in 
employment. As discussed earlier, the level of employment in privatized firms in western 
economies increased after privatization. It is also known that command economies often 
over-employed firms in order to reach the goal of full employment. The first hypothesis 
showed that Czech firms in this study decreased employment by almost 40% on average, 
which would indicate that privatized firms were over-employed and needed to reduce their 
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work force in order to compete in a market economy. Therefore, a decrease in 
employment is a sign of increasing efficiency. Low and high levels of ownership 
concentration have a negative effect on changes in employment. Moderate ownership 
levels have a positive effect on changes in employment which is contrary to expectations. 
Firm size, as measured by LASS, has a negative effect. This is not surprising, even 
considering.the effects of this variable on other efficiency ratios, because the larger the 
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Table Va Net Income Efficiency 
Estimates of the SUR regression, change in 
NIE dependent variable 
Y m,t = P m1'Xmt.1 + P m1.Xmt,2 + ... + P m1c.Xmt,k + E m,t 
Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Ratio p-value 
LOWN 0.1050 0.0310 3.39 0.001 
MOWN -0.0755 0.0237 -3.19 0.001 
HOWN 0.0414 0.0213 1.94 0.052 
Ind 16 0.9429 0.6048 1.56 0.119 
Ind 14 -0.7467 0.5932 -1.26 0.208 
Ind 12 1.8799 0.9687 1.94 0.052 
Ind 11 -0.0015 0.3545 0.00 0.997 
Ind 10 -0.6345 0.3624 -1.75 0.080 
Ind 9 1.5114 1.7230 0.88 0.380 
Ind 8 0.3998 0.2513 1.59 0.112 
Ind 6 0.1801 0.5488 0.33 0. 743 
· .lilililililililliililililililililil11111ilillilllllililililil11111111ililililililiiillilllililililil1lil1jiiil1ll:ililililii 
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Table Vb Sales Efficiency 
Estimates of the SUR regression, change in 
SE dependent variable 
Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Ratio p-value 
LOWN -0.0294 · 0.0059 -4.99 0.000 
MOWN 0.0057 0.0019 2.96 0.003 
HOWN 0.0025 0.0015 1.64 0.101 
-Ind 16 0.1056 0.0566 , 1.87 0.062 
Ind 14 0.1696 0.2473 0.69 0.493 
Ind 12 0.2555 0. 1137 2.25 0.025 
Ind 11 -0.0646 0.0501 -1.29 0.197 
Ind 10 -0.0052 0.0291 -0.18 0.857 
Ind 9 -0.1464 0.0477 -3.07 0:002 
Ind 8 0.1289 0.0298 4.32 0.000 
Ind 6 -0.0599 0.0560 -1.07 0.285 
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Table Ve Return on Assets 
Estimates of the SUR regression, change in 
ROA dependent variable 
Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Ratio p-value 
LOWN -0.0085 0.0131 -0.65 0.517 
MOWN 0.0433 0.0088 4.92 0.000 
HOWN -0.0387 0.0060 -6.48 0.000 
:111!1::i:::::::::::::::::::::1:i:Jtli::~1111::::::::::::::::::::11111:1:::::1:1::::i:::::::::::11111::~:1:::::::::::::::,11:~1:~1:1:::: 
-Ind 16 0.6124 0.2903 2.11 0.035 
Ind 14 -0.5578 0.2901 -1.92 0.055 
Ind 12 0.2463 0.2116 1.16 0.244 
Ind 11 -0.2855 0.2277 -1.25 0.210 
Ind 10 -0.8150 0.1602 -5.09 0.000 
Ind 9 0.9215 1.2650 0.73 0.466 
Ind 8 -0.2384 0.1285 -1.86 0.064 
Ind 6 -0.0045 0.1804 -0.02 0.980 
--
-
1111111111::1111111111:1:1111111111111~1,11111:11111:11:111111111111111111
1
::::11:1:11111::1:11111111:~;1111111111:111111:11111:;;111:11: 
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Table Vd Return on Sales 
Estimates of the SUR regression, change in 
ROS dependent variable 
Y m,t = /3 m1Xm1,1 + /3 m2Xm1.2 + ... + /J ,n1Xmt.k + e m.t 
Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Ratio p-value 
LOWN 0.0280 0.0269 1.04 0.298 
MOWN -0.0511 0.0193 -2.64 0.008 
HOWN 0.0031 0.0112 0.28 0.780 
-· Ind 16 0.7446 0.5353 1.39 0.164 Ind 14 -0.5151 0.8750 -0.59 0.556 
Ind 12 1.3672 0.5407 2.53 0.012 
Ind 11 -0.3962 0.3007 -1.32 0.188 
Ind 10 -0.6893 0.2426 -2.84 0.005 
Ind 9 0.7579 1.2430 0.61 0.542 
Ind 8 -0.0378 0.3182 -0.12 0.905 
Ind 6 -0.9248 3.1660 -0.30 0.767 
-
1111111111111111111:111111111111111111111111;1111111111:!iiJJJIIIJll!ll1IIIIIIIIIIIJIIJIIIJJIJJllllll!ljlilllijjllllllllllil1~111111111111 
111111111111111:11111111111111111111~1,11111111111111111::111111111111111111111111:1111111111111111;1i111111111111111111:1~1111111::111 
111111:11::1:::1:::1111:11\\\i\:l::1:11~1!11111111111111iiilllllllill!lilllllillllillllill1llllilil11ill!l!llilillllll11111111~iiili111i 
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Table Ve Real Sales 
Estimates of the SUR regression, change in 
RS dependent variable 
Y m,t = P mlXmt,l + P m2Xmt,2 + ... + P m1cXmt,k + E m,t 
Estimated Standard T-Ratio 
Variable Coefficient Error 1871 df p-value 
LOWN -0.0359. 0.0042 -8.49 0.000 
MOWN 0.0065 0.0013 5.01 0.000 
HOWN -0.0041 0.0009 -4.61 0.000 
Ind 16 -0.0069 0.0254 -0.27 0.786 
Ind 14 0.0476 0.0962 0.50 0.620 
Ind 12 -0.0643 0.0728 -1.29 0.196 
Ind 11 -0.2302 0.0523 -4.41 0.000 
Ind 10 -0.1456 0.0211 -6.90 0.000 
Ind 9 -0.2406 0.0542 -0.44 0.657 
Ind 8 0.1568 0.0330 0.48 0.634 
Ind 6 -0.0496 0.0330 -1.50 0.133 
1•1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
1
11111111 
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Table VfEmployment 
Estimates of the SUR regression, change in 
EMP dependent variable 
Y m,t = P mlXmt,l + P m2Xm1,2 + , , . + P mJ..Xmt,k + & m,t 
Estimated Standard T-Ratio 
Variable Coefficient Error 1871 df p-value 
LOWN -0.0261 0.0039 -6.73 0.000 
MOWN 0.0026 0.0012 2.24 0.025 
HOWN -0.0017 0.0009 -1.90 0.058 
-Ind 16 -0.1508 0.0264 -5.71 0.000 
Ind 14 -0.1244 0.0277 -4.48 0.000 
Ind 12 -0.0491 0.0645 -0.76 0.447 
Ind 11 -0.1523 0.0312 -4.87 0.000 
Ind 10 -0.1456 0.0208 -7.00 0.000 
Ind 9 -0.0873 0.0325 -2.69 0.007 
Ind 8 -0.1129 0.0213 -5.30 0.000 
Ind 6 -0.0921 0.0304 -3.03 0.002 
Constant 1.6328 0.1651 9.89 0.000 
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firm, the more employees it has to reduce. The presence of debt is also a negative effect. 
Additional monitoring by debtholders increases efficiency thrm1gh the reduction of the 
labor force. Foreign capital has a positive effect on the change in employment. Foreign 
capital provides the resources to possibly expand the production of the firm. This can be 
seen when analyzed in conjunction of the positive effect on real sales. 
It is interesting to note that the presence and level of government ownership is 
significantly positive. The government is reluctant to decrease the labor force, and in fact, 
increases the level of employment in the firms that it has ownership interests. 
Overall Results for the SUR. To clarify the· findings of the seemingly unrelated 
regression system, it is beneficial to look at the results as a whole. None of the ownership 
levels are consistently positively related.to the operating efficiency and profitability of the 
firm. Each level of ownership concentration is positively related to one performance or 
efficiency measure. Table Vla and VIb report a summary of the SUR system. The 
explanatory variables are designated with a "+" or "-" to signify a significant positive or 
negative impact on the changes in efficiency ratios. The results are reported for. an alpha 
level of 5% and then the window is expanded and results are reported for an alpha level of 
I 0% in Table Vlb. 
If the three largest owners own a small percentage of the firm, the firm restructures 
short-term by reducing employment. Changes in net income efficiency are positive for 
LOWN, but changes in return on assets return on sales are not significant. At the same 
time, changes in real sales, sales efficiency, and employment are significantly 
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Table Via 
Combined results for the SUR system 
at the 5% significance level 
Variable NIE SE ROA ROS RS EMP 
LOWN + 
MOWN + + +. + 
HOWN 
-Ind 16 + 
Ind 14 
Ind 12 + + 
Ind 11 
Ind 10 
Ind 9 
Ind 8 + 
Ind 6 
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Table VIb 
Combined results for the SUR system 
at the 10% significance level 
Variable NIE SE ROA ROS RS EMP 
LOWN + 
MOWN + + + + 
HOWN + 
-Ind 16 + + 
Ind 14 
Ind. lZ. + + + 
Ind 11 
Ind 10 
Ind 9 
Ind 8 + 
Ind 6 
negative. This would indicate that low ownership levels achieved their changes in net 
income efficiency mainly through reduced labor force because net income did not increase 
to have a significant positive change in ROA or ROS. If the firm made operational 
efficiency changes that increased net income, they would be reflected in ROS and/or ROA. 
Since these ratios did not change significantly, the increase in net income efficiency 
occurred because of the decrease in employment. Low ownership concentration has a 
significantly positively relationhip to reduction in labor usage in the post-privatization 
Czech Republic, but not to any other positive operating efficiency changes. 
Moderate ownership concentration, MOWN, has a positiv~ impact on operating 
efficiency and profitability. In this category of ownership, changes in sale efficiency, 
return on assets, and real sales, and employment levels all increase. In this category 
changes in net income efficiency.and return on sales are impacted negatively. It appears 
that these firms concentrated on increasing sales, not on improving the operations of the 
firm. However, changes in real sales, and nominal sales, are positively affected. Because 
of this, changes in return on sales would be more difficult to achieve, if net income did not 
increase by the same rate as sales. This is not to say that net income decreased ( change in 
return on assets is positive indicating an increase in net income), just increased at a slower 
rate than sales. The same is true for the explanation of the negative impact for the change 
in net income efficiency. The change in employment is positively impacted, indicating that 
employment levels increased, or decreased by an amount less than LOWN and MOWN. 
This would have a negative impact on the change in net income efficiency. 
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For moderate levels of ownership, the effect on the changes in efficiency and 
profitability are positive. The three largest owners at this level of ownership have 
significant ( at least 3 5% of the voting shares), if not complete ( 50% to 60% of shares), 
power to make changes. The SUR indicates that owners have used their influence to 
restructure the firm in a positive way. These firms have grown with respect to sales and 
employment. 
Firms with the greatest concentration of ownership experienced negative changes 
in operating efficiency. There is a significant negative impact of this ownership structure 
on changes in employment, changes in real sales and the changes in return on assets. This 
indicates that both the level of sales and net income are decreasing after privatization. 
Reductions in employment produced the positive change in net income efficiency. This is 
somewhat surprising because the three largest shareholders own at least 60% of the shares 
and therefore have majority ownership. The size of the firm has been brought up as a 
possible explanation of this. The possibility that smaller firms tend to have a more 
concentrated ownership structure and that investment funds that own these firms may 
neglect them because of the small weight in their portfolio. To explore this possibility, the 
correlation between the firm's assets and the percentage ownership of the three largest 
owners. The value of the correlation coefficients are 0.12 indicating no significant 
relationship between firm size and ownership concentration. 
Firm size, as measured by LASS, and other control variables are significant in SUR 
system and provide insight into the restructuring of the firm. Firm size has a consistent 
negative effect on the changes in efficiency after privatization. The larger the firm, the less 
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likely the firm will show improvement after privatization, regardless of ownership 
structure. Even though larger firms have·an advantage of potentially improving efficiency 
(through greater reduction in emploment or greater asset utilization), the complexity of 
operations and beauracracy seem to prevent efficiency gains from occurring. 
The presence of foreign capital or a partner in a joint venture has a positive effect 
on the firm after privatization. The same is true, but to a lesser extent, with debt. The 
presence of any of these financing arrangements provides more extensive monitoring than 
would otherwise occur. The type of monitoring these parties provide is different than that 
of the governing owners. Joint ventures and foreign capital are more likely to monitor 
operations of projects of which they are a part,· not the final quarterly or year-end ratios. 
In addition, foreign capital and joint ventures provide a mechanism in order to transfer 
technology in the form of mechanical innovations, information, or methods. This transfer 
will increase the operating efficiency in addition to opening markets for sale of the firm's 
products. 
The industry effects on firms after privatization vary, but there are some consistent 
results of the effects on efficiency measures across industries and on some industries 
across efficiency measures. With the exception of utilities, there is a negative effect of all 
the other industries on the change in employment. With most industries being over-
employed, this finding is not surprising. 
Between industries, there are significant differences in post-privatization 
performance. The utility and the service industries improved their performance overall, 
but mechanical engineering decreased efficiency in almost every measure. The better 
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performance of the utility industry should be expected because of the natural monopoly in 
which they operate. The service industry was able to improve its operations due to the 
relatively low assets and fixed costs that this industry has. Firms in the mechanical 
engineering industry performed far worse in the post-privatization period than the other 
industries. This may be due to the reliance of this industry on projects from the 
government. With the government playing a less significant role in the economy, the 
industries with the greatest reliance on the government will have the most difficult time 
after privatization. This is certainly the case in this industry. With the rest of the 
industries, there does not seem to be a consistent effect on the efficiency of operations and 
profitability. 
The last set of control variables consists of indicators that identify alternative 
means of share distribution: shares kept by the g~vernment, shares sold to foreign and 
domestic investors and intermediated selling of shares. Three significant findings emerge. 
The first is that firms with shares owned by the government, mostly long-term direct 
interest like that of OBC and TRZ, have increased employment. 
The second finding is thatlong-term direct government ownership tends to reduce 
the efficiency of the operations. Lipton and Sachs hypothesized that long-term 
government holding would not improve the firm. They believe that government oversight 
in the pre-privatization period caused firms to be inefficient and continued government 
ownership will increase the operating inefficiency. According to Liption and Sachs, 
governments should let the private sector and the markets weed out the bad firms during 
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and after the privatization process. If the state still owns firms, and continues to hold 
them, then there is little gain from the privatization process. 
Firms that are temporarily held by the government tend to do better than long-term 
government ownership, especially with respect to sales. There is incentive for these firms 
to restructure because they will be in the private sector and the government has an 
incentive to restructure these firms in order to receive a additional return from them when 
the firms are sold. For the most part, firms with temporary government holdings, DOC, 
do not increase nor decrease employment, but mainly focus on increasing sales (revenue). 
In spite of this, these firms do not increase operating efficiency, which can be seen in the 
effect on changes in net income efficiency and return on assets. The conclusion from this 
finding is that long-term government holdings of firms is not beneficial. 
The third finding is that direct. sales to domestic or foreign investors (PPT or PPZ) 
does not have a major effect of the firm's change in efficiency. These effects may be 
accounted for in the variables for joint venture and foreign capital. While N and FC are 
dummy variables, PPT and PPZ are the percentage of shares sold through this method. 
Results show that the importance is not the amount of shares sold directly to investors 
(revenue goes to government, not the firm), but that there is a transfer of capital and 
technology in the form of foreign capital or a joint venture. 
In summary, the success of a firm after privatization in restructuring the operations 
and improving profitability depends on ownership structure, size, other outside 
monitoring, minimal or no long-term government direct interest, and, to some extent, 
industry. The optimal level of ownership is a relatively,moderate concentration of the 
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three largest owners, about 35% to 60% of shares. This level of concentration allows for 
the large blockholders to have a considerable influence or control over the firm in order to 
make changes in the operations and increase operating efficiency and profitability, but also 
allow other types of ownership or monitoring, such as foreign capital and joint ventures. 
Low and high ownership concentration do not produce both of these factors of strength 
and outside monitoring. In the low ownership structure, the three largest owners do not 
have the power to make changes in the firm. In the high concentration, there is absolute 
power to make changes in the firm, but there is little room for other types of monitoring. 
With the growing liquidity and activity of the Czech markets, market discipline and the 
market for corporate control become more important. Examples of this are Michael 
Dingman's partnership with Viktor Kozeny as they acquired at least a 25% stake in 5 
Czech companies and majority ownership in three other firms, and in the recent takeover 
of Plzenska banka and other mutual funds by Jan Dienstl's group of investors. 
Besides ownership and monitoring factors, the other factors that determine the 
changes in efficiency after privatization are firm size, industry effects and long-term 
government interest. Firm size has a negative impact on changes in efficiency. The larger 
the firm, the more inefficient they are after privatization. In addition, firms that depended 
on the government for sales, non-consumer goods firms, the more negatively they were 
affected. Long-term government holdings have a negative impact on operating efficiency 
and performance. This indicates that the government is systematically holding firms that 
are underperforming, and that the government does not take an active interest in 
restructuring these firms. Sachs discussed one of the difficulties with a slow privatization 
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method is that firms that need to be privatized the most due to inefficiencies would not be 
because no one would buy them. This may be the same case for firms that have a long-
term government interest. Privatization needs to be complete, with no long-term holdings 
by the government. 
In contrast to long-term government holdings, short-term government holdings 
does not seem to have the same effect on changes in efficiency as long-term holdings. 
This finding is consistent with Perotti and Guney' s hypothesis and results, that the 
government expects an increase in value for these firms, and captures this value by selling 
their shares after privatization has occurred. 
Comparison of the Models. Since the definition and division of ownership 
variables are somewhat arbitrary, the outcome of the SUR may be the result of the 
definition oflow, moderate and high ownership levels. As mentioned previously, three 
different models were tested. The R-Square goodness of fit measure is 0.79, 0.60, and 
0.61 for Models 1, 2, and 3 repectively. The intercept term for these models are 1.33, 
1. 63, and 1. 61 respectively, which are all significant at the . 00 l level. The intercept is 
restricted to be equal across all equations. The models are consistent in most areas, 
especially in the effects of the control variables. The results for ownership variables for all 
three models are reported in Table VII. 
As previously defined, Model 1 specifies LOWN to be less than or equal to 30%, 
MOWN to be between 30% and 50%, and HOWN to be greater than 50%. Model 2 
specifies the cutoffs at 35% and 60%, and Model 3 at 40% and 70%. Moderate levels of 
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ownership have an overall positive or non-negative effect on changes in efficiency and 
profitability for each model. In contrast, LOWN has an overall negative affect on changes 
in operating efficiency and performance. 
Table VII 
Comparison of Estimated Coefficients for 
the Ownership Variables for the 
Three Different Models at the 
5% Significance Level 
Ownershie NIE SE ROA ROS RS EMP 
LOWN 
Model 1 + 
Model2 + 
Model3 + + 
MOWN 
Model 1 + + + + 
Model2 + + + + 
Model3 
HOWN 
Model 1 
Model2 
Model3 + 
The difference in the three models tested is the definition of the ownership 
variables. The definition of these variables overlap each other between the models, which 
affects the estimated coefficients in these models. Overall, the signs and significance levels 
for the ownership variables are consistent between the models. If the estimated coefficient 
is significantly negative for Model 1, it is negative for Models 2 and 3. There are some 
exceptions to this. The major differences are between Models 1 and 3 where the definition 
of the ownerhip variables are further apart. For example, LOWN in Model 3 contains all 
• 
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the LOWN firms and half the MOWN firms in Model 1. The differences in the 
coefficients in the models is caused by the overlapping of these ownership variables. Once 
the sign and significance for these variables change between models for a change in 
operating efficiency and performance equations, the change is permanent. This is 
consistent with the increasing percentage cutoffs in the ownership variables. 
Overall, the level of ownership by the three largest shareholders have consistent 
effects between the three models. The results reported by Model 2 for the second 
hypothesis hold for all three models. The level of ownership affects changes in operations 
and that an effective ownership structure is one of moderate level of ownership, between 
3 5% and 60%, by the three largest shareholders. The ownership concentration of this 
level restructured their firms in a positive manner after privaitzation. 
Types of Owners and Restructuring 
The second hypothesis that relates to ownership and restructuring is the 
relationship between the type of owner, one of the thirteen largest investment funds, and 
changes in operating efficiency and profitability. Ownership concentration is one measure 
of how firms are monitored by outside blockholders. Another measure of monitoring by 
outside blockholders is the type of owners. Investment funds controlled about 72% of the 
coupons of the first wave of privatization and the thirteen largest investment funds 
received approximately 50% of the total coupons available for the first wave. These 
thirteen funds have a large influence on the firms that they own and on the economy as a 
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whole. This hypothesis tests the differences in the firms that have at least one of the 
thirteen funds as one of their three largest shareholders and firms that do not. 
Of the 170 firms in the sample, 90 firms had at least one of these thirteen funds as 
their three largest shareholders. The percentage changes in operating efficiency and 
profitablility of these 90 firms with ownership by these large funds are compared to those 
that do not. Results are reported in Table VIII. 
Table VIII 
Mann-Whitney test of differences in percentage changes in efficiency 
ratios by ownership by 13 largest investment funds 
Mean T+ t-statistic 12-value 
Top 13 non-Top 13 
Fund Fund 
NIE 0.1783 -2.9531 8358 2.070 0.040 
SE 1.2572 1.5080 7852 0.490 0.626 
ROA -0.3097 -1.3016 8379 2.135 0.034 
ROS -0.4781 -2.4620 8113 1.305 0.192 
RS -0.1216 -0.2209 8115 1.311 0.190 
EMP -0.3316 -0.3802 8226 1.658 0.098 
For all measures of changes in operating efficiency and profitability except sales 
efficiency, firms that have one of the 13 largest investment funds as a large owner, have a 
more positive change in these ratios. Differences in percentage changes in net income 
efficiency and return on assets are greater at the .05 significance level and percentage 
change in employment at the .10 significance level. 
These test results indicate that the type of owner is also an important factor to that 
of the percent owned by the large blockholder. Firms improve performance when 
monitored by an influential outside blockholder. These outside blockholders can exert 
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their influence in ways that Shleifer and Vishny (1986) describe. These methods are the 
jawboning method, using their votes to replace the current management with their own 
management team, or taking over the firm. The use or the threat of using these techniques 
has caused these firms to restructure the operations of the firm to a greater extent than 
firms without this type of owner so that profitability is increased relative to the other 
firms. 
Efficiency Changes. Ownership, and Changes in Value 
As seen in the previous section, changes in operating efficiency and profitability are 
affected by ownership levels and the type of owner (B largest investment funds). Foreign 
capital, joint ventures, size, and government ownership also have an impact. A question 
that is just as important is if the developing capit!tl markets recognize improvements in 
efficiency and profitability and appropriately increase the value of the firm or decreases 
firm value if no improvements take place. This question is a loose test of market 
efficiency in the Czech Republic. 
To test the hypothesis that changes in efficiency are reflected in firm value, the 
effects of changes in efficiency and profitability are regressed against the change the 
relative value of the firm. The equally and value weighted index were explained at the 
beginning of the chapter. An index of sample and non-sample firms was created in order 
to capture the overall market returns, and a change in relative value measure is used. The 
initial price in coupons and the current price in Czech Crowns create the relative prices for 
the sample and index firms. A pooled cross-sectional time series regression is used to 
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measure the change in relative value during the 1993-94 period. Changes in efficiency and 
profitability are now included as explanatory variables with the ownership and control 
variables used in the SUR. Two other explanatory variables are included. The first is RS, 
a dummy variable that is one if the firm had shares available for auction in all five rounds. 
The second is PCTSLD, the percent of shares sold that were available for sale in the 
coupon auction. Both of these variables capture information revealed throughout the 
auction process. If RS is zero, all the shares were sold before the final round, and by 
definition, PCTSLD is equal to one. But PCTSLD has additional information. The 
percentage sold ranges from a low of7.38% to 100% of the shares offered. This provides 
information on which firms the market, investment funds and individuals alike, expected to 
be good investments and would make efficiency changes and increase in firm value. This 
information is also contained in the weighted price in terms of coupons, since the coupon 
price reflected the demand (the amount oversubscribed or undersubscribed at each coupon 
price) as determined by the Ministry of Finance during the auction process. 
The variables and estimated coefficients are reported in Tables IXa and IXb for the 
pooled cross-sectional time series of the change in relative value. Table IXa reports the 
estimations for the change in relative value based on the equally weighted index, Table 
IXb for the value weighted index. As in the previous tables, the ownership variables used 
in this regression are reported for Model 2. After privatization, very few firms issued 
shares to the open market, but shares with alternative distributions did occur, either sales 
directly to domestic or foreign investors, sales through intermediaries, or shares awarded 
to satisfy restitution claims as measured by the variables of PPT, TRV OBC, PPZ, RES, 
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and the others. The change in value for both of these indices between December 1993 and 
December 1994 is close to :..60%. This change in index value is reflected in the constant 
term which is significantly negative. 
For both indices, changes in relative value are affected by some of the changes in 
operating efficiency and profitability. Changes in net income efficiency, return on sales 
have a significant positive effect on changes in relative value, while changes in return on 
assets has a significant negative effect. Changes in real sales and sales efficiency have no 
effect on relative value. The results are mixed in a strict sense. A positive effect is 
expected for all the efficiency changes, with the possible exception of employment. 
The negative impact of the change in return on assets is contrary to intuition and 
can be explained when analyzing the control variables, especially size, proxied by the log 
of assets (LASS). There is a positive relationship between size and change in relative 
value, a positive size effect. This exists in contrast to the negative effect size has on 
changes in operating efficiency and profitability as reported in the SUR system. Investors 
prefer to hold larger, well known companies in spite of the slower rates of restructuring. 
Firms of smaller size had greater changes in return on assets. The size effect (LASS) 
dominates these two variables and explains the negative relationship found for changes in 
ROA. 
In addition to LASS, the presence of foreign capital has a positive effect on the 
change in relative firm value, as it did on the change in efficiency and profitability. The 
same is true with firms in the service industry and utility industry. Foreign capital allows 
for a transfer of technology and western experience and increases firm value. The firm's 
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industry also is important in the change in relative value of the firm, with the service and 
utility industries increasing value relative to other industries. 
Overall, firms with shares distributed by other means than coupon privatization 
experienced a significant decrease in value, both in the equally weighted and value 
weighted index. Other methods of share distribution include: Long-term government 
holdings, restitution, intermediated sales, and direct sales to domestic investors 
experienced decline measured by both indices. The equally weighted index also measured 
decreased relative value for transfers to local governments, temporary government 
holdings, and direct sales to foreign investors. In addition to having a negative effect on 
changes in operating efficiency and profitability, government holdings have a negative 
impact on value. 
The two additional explanatory variables, R5 and PCTSLD, have a significant 
effect on changes in relative value. For firms that went through all five rounds of the 
coupon auction, there is a significant negative effect. This is also shown by a significant 
positive effect of PCTSLD on relative value. These variables proxy for investors' 
expectations about firms they bought in the auction. These expectations were correct. 
Firms that sold al! or a high percentage of their shares (high demand) in the auction 
continued to increase in relative value after privatization while firms with a low percentage 
sold during the auction fared worse. Investors, whether through investment funds or 
individuals, were able to discern which firms would increase in firm value. 
The last set of explanatory variables is the set of ownership variables. When 
measured by the equally weighted index, the level of ownership had a significant effect. 
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The effect on the changein relative value is the same effect that occurred for a change in 
operating efficiency and profitability. There is a negative effect for low and high 
ownership structures and a significant positive effect for a moderate ownership structure. 
When measured by the value weighted index, the effect is not as strong, but it is the same 
direction for the variables that was found in the equally weighted index. Ownership 
structure does affect the value, but not in a direct, linear way. 
The results from the regression are consistent with the conclusion that changes in 
efficiency are priced in the market, and that there is a relationship between firm value and 
ownership structure. The change in relative firm value after privatization of these firms is 
positively affected by firm size, changes in net income efficiency, and return on sales, 
foreign capital, industry type, and a moderate concentration of ownership. Change in 
relative value is negatively affected by government holdings, change in return on assets, 
and low and high level of ownership. In addition, investor expectations of firms future 
value as revealed in the coupon auction are correct. Firms with a higher demand for their 
shares at the time of auction continued to increase in relative value compared to those 
firms which investors did not want. This is in addition to the price information reflected in 
the changing coupon prices for shares during the five rounds of the auction. 
Summary 
The empirical results are consistent with the hypotheses presented in the previous 
chapter with the exception of the first hypothesis. Ownership plays a significant role in 
restructuring the firm after privatization, and these changes in operating efficiency and 
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profitability are priced in the value of the firm. The best type of ownership structure is a 
moderate ownership concentration and one that has a large powerful blockholder as an 
owner, which was represented by one of the thirteen largest investment funds. 
Besides ownership concentration, firm size, foreign capital, industry type, and 
other share distributions play an important role in restructuring the firm. Firm size has a 
significant negative impact on changes in operating efficiencies and profitiability, but 
foreign capital has a significant positive effect. The results also show that continued long-
term governmental ownership has a negative, value decreasing effect on the firm 
98 
Table IXa 
Estimates of the Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series 
using the Equally Weighted Index 
Variable Estimated Standard T-Ratio p-value 
Coefficient Error 
LOWN -0.0187 0.0060 -3.09 0.002 
MOWN 0.0059 · 0.0029 2.07 0.039 
HOWN -0.0031 0.0019 -1.62 0.106 
IND 16 0.3580 0.0683 5.24 0.000 
IND 14 0.7169 0.4290 1.67 0.096 
IND 12 0.8162 0.1122 7.27 0.000 
IND 11 -0.2013 0.0706 -2.85 0.005 
IND 10 -0.0909 0.0597 -1.52 0.129 
IND 9 0.1409 0.0873 1.62 0.108 
IND 8 0.0978 0.0619 1.58 0.115 
IND6 -0.0453 0.1265 -0.36 0.721 
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RS -0.0920 0.0454 -2.03 0.044 
PCTSLD 0.0517 0.0100 5.16 0.000 
Constant -1.7249 0.2623 -6.58 0.000 
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Table IXb 
Estimates of the Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series 
using the Value Weighted Index 
Variable Estimated Standard T-Ratio p-value 
Coefficient Error 
LOWN -0.0045 0.0031 -1.44 0.150 
MOWN 0.0014 0.0016 0.90 0.370 
HOWN -0.0018 0.0011 -1.69 0.093 
IND 16 0.3038 0.0385 7.90 0.000 
IND 14 0.4447 0.3211 1.39 0.167 
IND 12 0.4674 0.0782 5.98 0.000 
IND 11 -0.0234 0.0397 -0.59 0.556 
IND 10 0.0273 0.0338 0.81 0.420 
IND 9 0.1093 0.0600 1.82 0.070 
IND 8 0.1814 0.0398 4.56 0.000 
IND 6 0.0158 0.0983 0.16 0.872 
RS -0.0568 0.0289 -1.97 0.050 
PCTSLD 0.0166 0.0057 2.93 0.004 
Constant -1.6714 0.1335 -12.52 0.000 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
This research tests the role of concentrated ownership of large blockholders in 
restructuring firms after privatization in the Czech Republic. The Shleifer and Vishny 
theory shows that large outside blockholders monitors the firm and increases firm value by 
improving operations and efficiency. Empirical studies show that large blockholders do 
add value to the firm. 
The Czech Republic's privatization program described in this study provided the 
opportunity of individuals to buy shares in privatized firms and to allow investment funds 
to collect privatization coupons and buy shares of privatized firms. This coupon 
privatization allowed for varying degrees of ownership concentration and the creation of 
large blockholders in these privatized firms. This change in ownership provides the 
opportunity to test the role oflarge blockholders and ownership concentration in the 
creation of firm value. 
The first hypothesis tests the effect of privatization of Czech firms on the firm's 
operating efficiency and profitability. The empirical results show that privatization in the 
Czech Republic led to a decrease in operating efficiency and profitability in the years 
immediately following privatization. This is contrary to the experience of privatized firms 
in western countries. Czech firms experienced decreased changes because of an unstable 
economic environment of high inflation and uncertainty and the lack of market discipline in 
restructuring the firm. 
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Because of the lack of market discipline on the firm, the role of large outside 
blockholders becomes more important in restructuring the firm. The second hypothesis 
tests the role of large blockholders in restructuring the firm. The influence of blockholders 
is measured by ownership concentration by the three largest shareholders. The ownership 
· is divided into three categories, low, moderate, and high levels of concentration. A 
seemingly unrelated regression tests the influence of owners on restructuring the firm. 
Changes in net income efficiency (NIE), sales efficiency (SE), return on assets (ROA), 
return on sales (ROS), real sales (RS), and total employment (EMP) measure restructuring 
of the firm after privatization. 
Results of the SUR system show that ownership plays an important role if 
restructuring of the firm after privatization. From the results, the following conclusions 
can be made about the factors affecting restructuring the firm. Moderate levels of 
ownership, between 35% and 60% ownership by the three largest owners, is the optimal 
level of ownership. Moderate levels of ownership has a positive overall effect on 
restructuring, but low and high ownership concentrations have an overall negative effect 
on the firm. 
In addition to ownership concentration, there are three other factors that have a 
major influence on changes in operating efficiency and profitability. Firm size has a 
significantly negative effect on all aspects of restructuring of the firm. Larger firms 
experience more negative changes than smaller firms. The second factor is that foreign 
capital has a significant impact on the restructuring by the firm. Outside monitoring, 
additional capital, and technology transfers help Czech firms improve operating efficiency 
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and profitability after privatization. The last major factor that affects restructuring is 
government ownership. Firms that have a long-term government interest experience 
significantly negative changes in operating efficiency and profitability. Privatization should 
be complete and government should completely divest their ownership interest. Short-
term government ownership does not have the same effect. 
The effect of restructuring and ownership on firm value is the final issue of this 
study. Ownership concentration, changes in operating efficiency and profitability, and the 
control variables are regressed against the changes in the firm's change in relative value. 
The measure of relative value includes the "prices" inthe coupon auction and the traded 
prices on the Prague Stock Exchange. The results of this test show that changes in 
operating efficiency and profitability are priced by the. market and that ownership 
concentration has an effect on change in relative firm value. The moderate ownership 
concentration increases relative value, but low and high concentration decreases relative 
value. This is consistent with the results in the second hypothesis. 
In addition to restructuring changes and ownership concentration, firm size and 
foreign capital have a significant positive effect on relative firm value, and other types of 
share distribution, ~uch as long-term government ownership or restitution, have a 
significantly negative effect on relative value. 
The last major finding from this test is that coupon privatization participants 
correctly valued firms in the auction. Firms with the highest percentage. of shares sold, 
indicating high demand and value, significantly increased in relative value after 
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privatization. This finding demonstrates that the Czech privatization process provided 
enough information to all participants to correctly value and then bid on these firms. 
Applications of Findings 
The first application of this study is for the privatization program in the Czech 
Republic. The level of ownership concentration is important in the restructuring of the 
firm and in increasing the value of the firm. The Czech Republic should break up high 
ownership concentrations (greater than 60%) and encourage moderate levels of ownership 
concentration. The government should also fully divest long-term holdings in firms, 
completely privatizing these firms. The government should also implement a policy and 
environment that is favorable to foreign capital and joint ventures. These policies will help 
firms make value increasing changes in operations. 
The second application of this study is for other former communist countries. 
These countries should pursue an aggressive privatization program that includes 
participation by the citizens and the formation of large blockholders. Although the. Czech 
plan is not feasible for every country, this program can be adapted to fit the political and 
social environment of the specific country. The Czech program provides information on 
the basic elements of large scale privatization which includes publicly available information 
about all the firms being privatized, an open auction process, and the market's formation 
of large blockholders. 
The third application of this study is the addition to the current literature of 
ownership and firm value. This study finds support for Shleifer and Vishny's model and 
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support for a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. This 
relationship is similar to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny' s model. These findings conclude 
that ownership is important to firm value. 
The final application is to the U.S. market. Although these results are not directly 
applicable to U.S. markets, they do show the importance oflarge blockholders in 
monitoring if not becoming active in firm management. Investment companies, pension 
funds, and insurance companies are able to provide a valuable monitoring service to the 
firm and increase the value of the firm in which they have ownership. 
Future Research 
The findings in this research are limited in scope and time. This research looks at 
only one wave of Czech privatization and analyzes the effects for a short-time period 
immediately following privatization. Future research possibilities include looking at the 
second and third waves of privatization and analyzing the restructuring for all firms for a 
longer time period, up to a decade, to determine the impact and the extent of privatization. 
The longer time period would allow for markets and firms adjust to determine the full 
effect of mass privatization. The inclusion of all Czech firms in a future study may provide 
collaborative support for these findings. 
Another possible area of future research is to analyze small scale privatization and 
the development of small enterprise in the Czech Republic. These business sectors were 
not included in this research, but were an important part of the privatization process. The 
mot pertinent areas of this research are analyzing the new owners and what their relation 
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to the business was before privatization (manager, employee, supplier, retailer, or other), 
the performance of these firms after privatization, and the impact of new businesses in the 
Czech Republic. 
The last area of future research is the auction process. The auction used in the 
large scale privatizations is not a common process, especially in the U.S. and with limited 
number of bidding rounds. The success of this auction in the CR provides the opportunity 
for research in the areas of auction efficiency and the information revealed before and 
during the auction, as well as the price determination of the next rounds auction prices. 
This is an important area of research with applications to other countries that wish to use a 
similar auction in privatization or with countries that are developing call financial markets. 
These areas are the most important areas of research in the area of finance. There 
is much to learn as all fields of research and sudy watch these markets develop and experts 
are asked to give input and advice. It is my deepest wish that this developing market will 
continue to grow and the resources needed to study this market are provided in continuing 
fellowships and grants. 
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